Strategy, Operations & Tactics – Described
Academic Buckshot
I remember being told about research that said that the US squad is basically on par with forces like Afghan insurgents. At first I was taken aback. Upon further clarification, the equality was not concerned with technical capability, but rather a cognitive one. Basically, if you can out think your opponent, you can accomplish your objective with little emphasis on technology. I didn’t take much of a jump for me to understand this is why guys in flip flops and rusty weapons can cause so many problems with guys carrying $20k worth of equipment on their persons.
Several of our contributing authors to WarNerds (and formerly ODJournal) are on the cutting edge of cognitive research. Their work has appeared in the 2nd quarter issue if Infantry Magazine. You can find it below, along with the academic paper they wrote to support it.
BG Ward, R.; SGT Jackson, T.; Lowrance, N.; and Larsen, C. E. (2017). Cognitive Dominance through the Engagement Decision Matrix. Infantry Magazine. Ft. Benning, GA: US Army.
Or get it here on WarNerds should the link ever break: Cognitive Dominance through the Engagement Decision Matrix
Larsen, C. E.; Lowrance, N.; and Jackson, T. (2016). Engagement Decision Matrix: A model of cognitive dominance for the infantry squad. Academia.edu.
Or get it here on WarNerds should the link ever break: Engagement Decision Matrix A model of cognitive dominance for the infantry squad
Closely related to these articles is the Doctoral dissertation by Larsen. We need leadership education like this so we can raise a generation of thinkers rather than button pushers.
Larsen, C. E. (2015). A Case Study of the Cognitive Apprenticeship Model in Leadership Education (Doctoral dissertation, University of Missouri–Columbia).
Or get it here on WarNerds should the link ever break: A Case Study of the Cognitive Apprenticeship Model in Leadership Education
Reaffirming Understanding Through Unconventional War Gaming
Hopefully by now it should be clear to this audience that we don’t turn our noses up to the idea of War Games. There is a deep rooted German military tradition of kriegspiele – mastery through wargaming. This is carried on today in modern military’s throughout the world. One of the larger war games is Red Flag. It is an air dominate exercise based out of Nevada that occurs four to six cycles per year.
We also don’t shy away from simulation or virtual war gaming and neither does the US Military. Since the mid 1980’s they’ve used SIMNET which is a real-time distributed simulator for combat simulation of tanks, helicopters and airplanes in a virtual battlefield. If that isn’t the first internet video game, I don’t know what would be.
Now what happens when the authenticity and even realism of the simulation system gets peeled away, or at least distorted in gaming? Do the Principles of War, as most notably defined by Clausewitz, still apply?
I think back to my childhood watching episodes of Star Trek: The Next Generation. Did the Principles of War apply in this fictitious universe under new rules of physics and relativity? I think they still do, even with the viewer not fully understanding these rules. (Although I will never understand why two ships always met in the same orientation. Who determines which way is “up” in space anyway?)
A close friend Bret, fellow contributor to WarNerds.com and Deputy Director of Training at One Shepherd, invited me to play a different type of game than I’m used to. As he explained the mechanics, I recoiled because of its basis in fantasy and inauthentic, inconsistent scientific rules and logic. I don’t have an interest in learning about a system that doesn’t exist. Because I’m also a math and science nerd who genuinely gets excited over Excel spreadsheets, he insisted I’d love it for that reason as the core of the game mechanics is based on math. Recalling my earlier attempts at real time strategy games, I wasn’t looking forward to the experience even though this was technically a different classification of game. There was so much I wanted to control – so much memorization of character stats and abilities that I would become overwhelmed and end up micro managing the few sources of success at the demise of the overall state of my forces.
Under his guidance I gave the game a chance. He insisted that the Principles of War applied and the game required effective understanding and use of them in order to be successful. In my numerous failures and the frustration that followed, I challenged his assertion. How can massing be achieved if the enemy can literally disappear momentarily or move me back in time a few seconds ago? How can we out maneuver in such a limited number of prescribed geographic lanes? How is this simple when I have to study a nearly unlimited combination of friendly and enemy compositions and abilities? At what point in our technological advances and scientific discoveries do the Principals of War cease to apply?
One of the things that stuck out to me was a comment made by another friend of Bret’s who was helping me get started. I was expressing my frustration with the combat model and how there was no intuition I could use for scenarios and enemy abilities I hadn’t seen and constantly change. What he explained later ended up being very profound, though at the time it only added to my frustration. He said something to the effect of, “You’re focusing too much on the combat mechanics. You have to understand this is an economy game disguised as a physical combat game. The more you earn early on, the more economic advantage you will have later on which is how you ultimately win.”
In my frustration with the lack of success I said, “So this game is nothing more that two very massive and complex spreadsheets fighting each other”. Further fueling my frustration and a bit to my surprise, every player in the room responded with a resounding “Yes.” What follows is a conversation over text message between Bret and myself.
Matt: “Principals of war don’t really apply. The concept of massing is not physical. Maneuver is a pseudonym.”
Bret: “I’m not sure why you would say that. I believe the principals apply. Think of using the shadow plane as camouflage and concealment. As you maneuver you seek to mask you movements in some way in real life. The game just has a specific way of doing it.
Maneuver is your rotations and covering down on towers and lanes. We call it positioning a lot. If you are not in the correct position your lane can be taken.
Massing is physical in game. If you see an enemy by themselves or defending a tower alone you mass at that site to overwhelm the enemy at that location. Same thing if you see an enemy massing in a lane you must mass there with your team otherwise the tower will fall.
The principals of war apply, you just have to be open to accepting the alternate rules of physics and find the analogous models for how we apply them in game.”
Matt: “That last paragraph is where I have some friction. the game is not authentic in it’s analogous model to that. It truly is two spreadsheets fighting. Kinda cool but misrepresented it its’ presentation.
Bret: “What do you mean by authentic? It’s an alternate universe with different rules/laws. What would make the analogous model authentic? Yes, spreadsheet, but the problem still with that is that it doesn’t account for human error and the application and timing of abilities used. If you adopt that frame of mind, then every game is two spreadsheets fighting, isn’t it?”
That last sentence took me aback as I believe he intended it as a pejorative comment. I wanted to say no, though some part of me does recognize that all games can be described and played out with math. Game theory has far reaching applications and implications. War gaming is ultimately the medium by which you verify a theory of imposing your will on an opponent.
I approached the game with a new mentality. This is an economy game disguised as physical combat. Do not concern your self with the appearance of characters or how abilities are physically represented. Think only of the mathematical effects and what you can do to maximize your gain while minimizing your opponents. That change in approach had a profound effect on my understanding of the Principals of War when you break it down to it’s simplest form. It had a profound impact on my ability to achieve success, and in the cases where I lost, understand strategically what went wrong.
Playing a battle game based on fantasy and alternate physics has not only reaffirmed my understanding of the Principals of War, I can see larger implications of these concepts in other areas of life. I’m making links between things like personal finance and the Principals of War I had never connected before. My mind is going back to more authentic war gaming models and I’m seeing them in a new light. Rather than concerning myself with micro tactics and even tactics as a whole, I’m beginning to see how these principals have a major impact on strategy that I now understand, where I only thought I did previously. I’m starting to see more clearly above the tactical level of warfare and filter down all of that effort and detail to its simplest elements.
I encourage you to try and find success in something new. Break things down into their simplest elements and learn what successful people do. Then emulate that. Based on my experience, I think you can learn more than you thought possible.
The game is Paragon and is currently free on PC and PS4. Comment with your in-game handle and come play with us!
History Buffs: Tora! Tora! Tora!
Although we want to stick with original content here at War Nerds, this is too good not to share. His YouTube channel is full of similar content.
Communications Breakdown: Part 3 (Bonus Video Example)
Due to the popularity of the previous article in this series, we present you with a real life example recorded during One Shepherd’s Fall 2015 field training exercise (FTX). The video was recorded in an S-250 communications shelter. It houses the radio/telephone operator (RTO) equipment used by the tactical operations center (TOC). In this specific example, it depicts a conversation between a team and higher command.
Communications Breakdown: Part 2
In Part 1 of this series, we framed the SOI as to its use and focused on the portions that do not involve a radio. Building upon that knowledge, we’ll discuss Call
Signs, Encryption Code/Authentication Tables, and Brevity Codes. Each of these is a must when communicating over a radio in order to keep your message ambiguous to any unwanted listening ear.
Call Signs:
In most circumstances, call signs are designated by an alpha-numerical group. For instance, in the above example “Y44”, pronounced “Yan-kee Fow-er Fow-er”, represents Higher Command. You will notice that for Squads 2-4 there is no letter assigned to them. This is because they all share the same designation of “B” or “Bravo”. In this situation all squads are represented by “Bravo” and designated by their different numbers. If I wanted to contact Squad 4 I would use the call sign “B22” (Bravo Two Two). Without getting too far into radio etiquette, when we want to contact someone we will say their name twice and our name once as seen below:
“Yankee Four Four, Yankee Four Four, this is Bravo Two One, OVER.”
Encryption Code/ Authentication Table:
This portion serves two different functions: Coding numbers and Authentication. To represent the numbers 0-9, we tend to use a single ten letter word with no repeated letters such as “Binoculars”. You can use a combination of words as long as it totals ten letters and does not repeat any of the letters between the two words as seen above with “Dumbwaiter”. In fact, the authentication table can simply be a combination of ten random letters; however, use of random letters makes memorizing the authentication table extremely difficult.
In the event that you believe someone is using your radio frequency that should not be using it (i.e. – you do not recognize the other person’s voice), you should request an Authentication to make sure they are who they say they are. The Authentication can change with every SOI or can be set as a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) by the unit. In this case, the table states that the Authentication is “2 right”. This means that when someone requests an Authentication, you will move two slots to the right and return the letter and number. It will look something like this:
“Bravo Two One, Authenticate ‘Whiskey’, OVER”
“Yankee Four Four, I Authenticate ‘India Seven’, OVER”
You will notice that Higher requested authentication of “W”. From there we moved two positions to the right (2 right) and answer, “I-7”. As stated before, this authentication can be changed with every SOI or can be set in stone. The important thing is that EVERYONE is on the same page with what the authentication process is.
Brevity Codes:
As stated above, SOI can be much more comprehensive. Next we will discuss organization and use of an SOI. Below we see some examples of things you may wish to communicate in a secure manner.
Above are two categories; REQUESTS and SITUATION REPORTS (SITREP). Each message that we wish to send is on the left side of the columns while the code word it corresponds to is on the right side of the columns (i.e. – Situation Report = COLLAR). You will notice that within each category, all of the code words begin with the same letter. This is the chosen organizational method for this specific example. While organizing the categories’ code words is not required, it does make decoding significantly faster. This is due to the fact that if one hears a word that starts with “A” then they know to look under the SITREP column. The best way to understand how to use the SOI is to analyze a few examples.
For instance, let us say Higher Command wants to know where you are in your mission and what you are doing. They would be asking for a Situational Report (SITREP) and you want to tell them that you are at your Objective Rally Point (ORP). With Higher Command in BOLD and you in Italics, the radio traffic would look something like this:
Coded Message:
“Bravo Two One, Bravo Two One, this is Yankee Four Four, OVER”
“Yankee Four Four, this is Bravo Two One, OVER”
“Bravo Two One, message follows, OVER”
“Yankee Four Four, send message, OVER”
“I send, COLLAR, how copy. OVER”
“I copy COLLAR, OVER”
“Good Copy, Over”
“Wait one”
“Yankee Four Four, I send ARMAGEDDON, ARROGANT, ANSWER, how copy, OVER”
“I copy ARMAGEDDON, ARROGANT, ANSWER, OVER”
“Good Copy, OVER”
“Understood, Yankee Four Four, OUT”
Decoded Message:
“Bravo Two One, Bravo Two One, this is Yankee Four Four, OVER”
“Yankee Four Four, this is Bravo Two One, OVER”
“Bravo Two One, message follows, OVER”
- Higher is giving you a heads up that they are about to send a message so that you can get your writing materials ready to copy the message.
“Yankee Four Four, send message, OVER”
- Once you are prepared to copy the message, you tell Higher to send the message.
“I send, COLLAR, how copy. OVER”
“I copy COLLAR, OVER”
“Good Copy, Over”
“Wait one”
- We decode to find out that COLLAR means SITREP. They want a Situation Report
- At this point we want to send that we are “Halted in our Objective Rally Point”, thus we use the codes for Halted, In/At/On, ORP
“Yankee Four Four, I send ARMAGEDDON, ARROGANT, ANSWER, how copy, OVER”
“I copy ARMAGEDDON, ARROGANT, ANSWER, OVER”
“Good Copy, OVER”
- Higher command decodes the message and understands that the patrol is in their ORP. Then sends:
Understood, Yankee Four Four, OUT
As you can see, Higher Command just got a real time situation report from a patrol in a secure manner. Even if the enemy was listening to the transmission, they would have no idea what was being communicated; unless of course they had one of our SOI’s. You will also notice that each time a coded message is sent, it is “copied” by the receiver to ensure that they heard the correct word over the radio. This seems redundant; however, this is the procedure used to ensure that communications are proficient and conveyed correctly. It is simply a procedure to make sure you are decoding the correct information and not recording the wrong code word, adding unnecessary confusion to your communication. Now, it is also important to understand that at times, these messages can be expedited as well. When communicating with someone who is familiar, certain steps can be skilled in order to speed up the communication. This is beneficial as it reduces the “time on the net” which in turn makes it more difficult for the enemy to triangulate your position, should they have the equipment to do so. That, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
Conclusion
An SOI can be as comprehensive or as simple as the mission requires. The important thing is that you have the ability to communicate securely and efficiently. Although technological advancements have allowed today’s militaries to encrypt communications, it is important to understand that technology fails. Yes, you may have a fancy GPS, but you should not solely rely on this equipment. You still carry and remain proficient with a map and compass. The same is true with this form of communication. Regardless of the manner chosen to communicate, the ability to communicate effectively can often times be the essential factor between success and failure. Over my many years of experience in One Shepherd, I cannot think of a single AAR that did not have communication come up as something to improve on. Communication is a force multiplier. Setting up lines of communication, establishing a communications SOP, and securing messages through efficient use of SOI can help any team communicate masterfully. These competencies in communication can be translated to any team, unit, project group, or leadership position. Good leaders acknowledge this fact and continuously seek to communicate more effectively.
Doing It All Over Again
“If I had it to do all over again”, or, “If I had only known then what I know now”… how often have you heard those sentiments, or perhaps even expressed them yourself? The lessons we learned in the “school of hard knocks” have become engraved on our brains in a way that no classroom lecture ever can. Yet, the trouble with learning by experience is that some endeavors are so costly in failure, that the student never gets a second chance to benefit from his mistakes. War is certainly such an endeavor. How many Alexanders and Napoleons might the world have known if only they had not died in their first attempt at battle? The sci- fi film, Edge of Tomorrow, postulates just such a scenario. In the film, Private Cage, played by Tom Cruise, is repeatedly killed in battle, only to be resurrected again just hours before the battle, to relive the events again. In the film, Cage begins as a bumbling idiot; however, contrary to Heraclitus, he treads in the same river again and again, each time benefiting form the lessons he learned previously, and eventually emerges the consummate warrior. I won’t spoil the plot for you by telling whether or not he single- handedly wins the war, and the heart of the pretty girl. All well and good in fiction, but until we find a way to resurrect departed soldiers, we must find a different way to train.
Early in the 1960s, Colonel John Boyd, a USAF fighter pilot, tried to determine the secret of successful fighter pilots. He devised the now- famous O.O.D.A. loop, with O.O.D.A. standing for Observe, Orient Decide and Act. The pilot first observes the enemy aircraft, orients himself to said aircraft, decides how to engage (or not) the aircraft, then acts on that decision. It is called a loop, because as the pilot’s action will have an effect on the enemy aircraft. He then starts over again, observing the effect, re- orienting to the enemy, deciding a new course of action, and acting. Boyd found that the pilot who could cycle through that loop faster than his adversary prevailed.
The problem with Boyd’s O.O.D.A. loop is that it is a little bit like saying, “to win a football game one must score more points than one’s opponent”. It describes accurately what must happen, without explaining how to bring it about. Most attempts at describing the ‘how’, have done so by inserting a series of flow charts between the steps of O.O.D.A. It is as if the pilot is flying along with a series of simple plans in his mind; ‘if I observe the enemy in front execute plan A, if he is above me plan B, if behind me plan C’ , etc. In practice, the flow chart method for an Infantry man might look something like this:
Imagine a foot patrol is tasked with clearing a route; say, for example, a logging road through the woods. Along the way, the point man Observes that he is taking fire. He furthermore Observes that the people shooting at him are indeed wearing enemy uniforms. He then Orients himself to the enemy using the flow chart. Is the enemy closer than hand grenade range? Yes? No? Are there any barriers between him and the enemy? He decides the answer to both questions is yes; therefore, he decides to direct the squad to assault through the ambush. Having made that decision, he Acts on it. He then Observes the result, starting the process over again.
This is all well and good for developing a classroom understanding, but flow charts are too cumbersome for critical decisions that must be made instantaneously. The above- described squad would be annihilated by any halfway- skilled enemy, before the point man made it to the decision part of the process.
Enter a contemporary researcher, Gary Kline, who studied firefighters and neonatal nurses, among others, to understand how people make important decisions under pressure of time. He found that these professionals, and others like them, based their decisions, not on any flow chart, but on past experience. One example he outlines is of a firefighter, who must rescue a woman hanging on a ledge over a busy freeway. Based on his past experience, he knows he does not have the time stop traffic and reach her with a ladder, and so decides, also based on experience, that he can lower a rescuer on a rope from above. It is noteworthy that the firefighter in this story went through the O.O.D.A loop process, he just did not use the flow chart method of decision making; rather he recognized similarities to his past experience, and acted upon those experiences. Kline calls this “recognition primed decision making”.
Let’s look at our infantry patrol above, from a recognition based decision making model. The point man begins leading his patrol along the logging road, as his orders prescribe. As the patrol travels down the road, it becomes more and more sunken, until it begins to resemble a ravine. The point man begins to have a bad feeling about his route, because it resembles a place where he had conducted a successful ambush against an enemy patrol. With this on his mind, he spots two enemy soldiers lying in the tall weeds at the edge of the ravine to his left. The point man instantly recognizes that his squad has assaulted similarly sized forces across similar terrain with success in the past. He eminently opens fire, while shouting to his buddies, “Ambush left, 20 meters!” The rest of the squad, having been through this before, needs no elaborate explanation, but rushes through the enemy position with alacrity.
Again, our hypothetical patrol goes though the O.O.D.A. loop process, but, due to their past experience, they do so much more quickly. As Boyd found, he who OODA’s first, wins. Kline’s work found that the more experienced individuals make better decisions faster than less experienced people. That should come as a shock to no one. This brings us back to Private Cage from Edge of Tomorrow, and the question: how do we give someone experience without killing him in the process?
One answer is to simulate the experience. This immediately brings to mind million dollar flight simulators, and other training aids. As useful as these methods are, simulation is much older, and far simpler. Simulation can be as simple as two boxers sparing at 1/3 power, thus allowing them to learn the lessons of boxing without getting seriously hurt in the process. Long before any scientist studied these things, children were practicing war with games. Tag, hide- and- seek, and red rover are all war games. The nature and value of authentic simulation is a topic for another post, but with a force on force simulation, you really can do it all over again.
Training vs Simulation : Authenticity vs Realism
Ever had meaningful small unit tactics training with Nerf guns? I have.
Being highly involved in putting together the small unit training that One Shepherd provides and a war gamer, I’ve seen confusion and struggle when putting together something under either of these banners. Gamers often say they want realism in their war games when they usually mean authenticity, and vice-versa with trainers. Gamer’s ogle over realism when it’s not actually provided, and trainers strive too much for realism when then just need authenticity. Add in a factor of peoples desire for entertainment and it gets even more complicated.
Let me explain. First, we have to settle on terminology. We’ll define simulation and training, and then authenticity and realism.
In this context when I use the term simulation, it can basically be defined as a war game. According to Merriam-Webster, a war game is a simulated battle or campaign to test military concepts and usually conducted in conferences by officers acting as the opposing staffs : a two-sided umpired training maneuver with actual elements of the armed forces participating. This understanding automatically puts the focus on the testing and verification of military concepts. In other words, it’s just not built to being intentionally entertaining. It’s not really training either.
In the entertainment industry, there are more than a few games (board, video, or otherwise) that claim to do war gaming. Only a hand full actually do. I don’t begrudge them for that, because who wants to simulate walking land nav for three hours before hitting your objective of watching an empty valley all night – all while sitting at a computer screen. At the same time I say that, I can’t ignore game platforms like ARMA (which is the commercial version of Virtual Battle Space or VBS used by the US and forces around the world). It’s on its third iteration and has a worldwide following of over three million players. When employed under the banner of war gaming, ARMA/VBS becomes a valuable tool for anything from small unit tactics or as part of the Military Decision Making Process and everything in between. Here the Premack Principal applies though – very few people engage in a game marketed as entertaining for the specific purposes of training. They will endure training but only as long as that brings them a more entertaining experience.
Training on the other hand is defined as the act, process, or method of one that trains. People train to lift weights, type faster, and win at monopoly. It’s important to note that the objective of training is not necessarily reflected in the training itself. Training in push ups is useful for wrestling but it doesn’t show up in a match ever. What is important here is context provided by a good instructor. Training to shoot shapes and colors on a target as fast as possible on the instructors command doesn’t at all translate to a gunfight whatsoever. When re-framed in context of an exercise used to get the brain thinking about something other than the mechanics of shooting, that training becomes more tolerable.
The second set of terms that are often confused are authenticity and realism. These mean two very different things when it comes to training or war gaming. Authenticity is defined as conforming to an original so as to reproduce essential features. Realism, on the other hand, is concerned for fact or reality.
In both training and war gaming, the goal of training or war gaming must be clarified. This will help go a long way to align participants expectations. If you were a reenacting group, you would certainly align yourself with realism, usually down to the stitch. Authenticity has a different approach. Realism says, “That rucksack is the wrong color and doesn’t have the correct buckles!” Authenticity says, “He has a rucksack.”
This works both ways. Authenticity can take things too far as well. “My air-soft rifle holds ammunition” Sure it’s authentic in that it holds ammunition, but realism says, “A single magazine holes 300+ BB’s therefore you won’t need to reload during this CQB scenario and that isn’t realistic.” This is also true.
The best recent example of this was watching a master instructor teach mobile defense to a few squads. Rather than placing their practical exercise in the field with weapons and blanks, he chose to use Nerf guns on the FoB (Forward Operating Base). This constructive exercise was authentic with respect to the terminal learning objective. Due to the short range of the engagements along with a few other stipulated rules, the students were able to grasp all of the working parts of a mobile defense because they could see it. Without that condensed range, the students would have been left in small groups in the field without any situational awareness as to what other units were doing. They would have also wasted a lot of time with some groups not even engaging. They would only learn later through storied conversation as to what happened. By having an exercise that authentically positioned the students in a mobile defense within the confines of the game and associated rules, they were able to reach an real understanding of the lesson very quickly.
The relative assignment of training, simulation, authenticity, realism can be rather subjective. With that in mind, we’ll use the following graphic to summarize these points with a specific outcomes or objectives in mind.
Civil War Re-enacting, when taken completely seriously, is very realistic. It’s also very much a simulation in that they are testing (or in this case re-testing) specific military concepts. MDMP war gaming on the other had doesn’t necessarily care to have a completely realistic realm by which to test a concept. It might be entirely software based or quite often hashed out through dialogue among the battle staff in a room somewhere. ARMA based land nav is fun considering you can do it in an air conditioned room while eating a pizza. More fun than actually walking for hours on end through rough terrain. It’s authentic in that it can drive home the major points of land nav. It’s not very realistic in the sense that your pace count is always perfect regardless of slope or fatigue and you don’t have to worry about magnetic declination or interference. An F/A-18 Flight simulator is a 1:1 replica of all the working functions of its real counterpart and is therefore appropriate for most training oriented towards the operation of the aircraft controls and functions. It would not be appropriate for G-force training or how to fly inverted as these platforms are often motionless.
Whatever camp you are in, make sure you define your objectives clearly for all parties involved. This goes for instructors and participants. Training objectives should be clearly defined as an instructor and should be communicated somehow to the students. This can be done directly, or culturally through community expectations like the example found in kids sports teams that don’t keep score. Participants should also clarify their expectations and desires. Are you there to experience a realistic simulation or would you be better off framing your experience as authentic training for what you are wanting to accomplish? Be honest with yourself, but don’t be surprised when authentic training means you put down your rifle and pick up Nerf guns every once in a while.
Tactical Security Operations: The Screen
As I mentioned in my last article, ”Area and Local Security: Conceptual framing for Tactical Security Operations”, there are three similar, yet separate forms of TSO; Screen, Guard, and Cover. Each entail a progressively higher level of capability and requirements. These three categories employ a variety of tactics, techniques, and procedures to achieve success. They also entail a progressive level of active and passive resistance to enemy elements. These three forms fall under the category of tactical enabling, which, like its namesake suggests enables or shapes conditions for other types of operations.
The Screening Force Composition
The screening force is comprised of lightly numbered and armed elements, which are smaller elements of a larger force. The benefit to using the screen is the larger force can accomplish other tasks, while the smaller element provides early warning to the larger force. This enables the larger force time and space to react to enemy situations. The screening force seeks to find, monitor and or disrupt enemy reconnaissance activity. The larger friendly force uses a screening mission when; gaps exist between friendly forces, when friendly flanks, or rear are exposed and when the likelihood of enemy contact is remote and or the expected enemy force is small. Lastly the screening force may be used when the main friendly force only needs a minimum amount of time to react to a larger force.
The Screen Mission
A Screen is a mission requiring an element to provide early warning of enemy activity and or movement for a larger force. The Screen enables the larger friendly element to react upon discovery of enemy action. The Screen typically reports enemy activity and maintains visual/audio contact throughout the task. It may at times be tasked to disrupt enemy reconnaissance and infiltration activities through a variety of techniques. It should not, however be expected to disrupt forces more capable than reconnaissance elements due to its limited size and weapons capabilities. Screens can utilize several techniques to accomplish their task.
The Moving Screen
Roving patrols , or moving screens, help cover more ground and enable the screening force to actively seek out enemy reconnaissance elements. The Screen patrol can change its speed of march to force the enemy element to react.Changing the speed at which your screening patrol(s) move can catch your enemy off guard especially if its a larger size or you may force the enemy element to hide and evade your moving patrol. This patrols actively seek contact with the assumption that force will be used to disrupt enemy activity. Screening patrols must be prepared to make “Hard contact” or exchange fires. This does not preclude a moving screen from making “Soft contact” or visual only contact with the enemy once or for continued surveillance. Like any good game however, your opponent gets a vote and many have learned how to bypass moving screening patrols.
The Static Screen
The static or stationary screen, utilizes Listening Posts/Observation Posts (LP/OPs) to passively survey for enemy elements. This technique attempts in targeting enemy elements while they move and enables your elements to stay hidden, hopefully keeping the enemy elements unaware. The benefit to the Static Screen is that enemy elements may be looking for screening patrols but rarely find well placed LP/OP’s. LP/OP’s only require a minimum of two people, which can maximize the amount of friendly elements coverage area with a smaller force. The downsides to the static screen technique is that the enemy can quickly move out of visual contact with the LP/OP and will require another static or moving screen to regain contact, potentially risking a loss in contact with enemy forces. The traditionally smaller friendly LP/OP position is at risk from being overwhelmed by a larger enemy element.
The Combination Screen
The third technique is that of both Static LP/OP’s and Moving patrols. This combination of active and passive techniques seek to force the enemy to move away from roving patrols and into your static LP/OP’s contact. Once contact is made the moving patrols or a reserve can intercept enemy reconnaissance or infiltration elements while the LP/OP’s can remain hidden to continue their screening task. By having a variety of moving and static elements the enemy is forced to guess when and where you will have eyes and ears. The moving screen may stop and become static for extended periods to disrupt enemy action. These variations in moving and static positions must be coordinated prior too and communicated to all elements to ensure fratricide does not occur while friendly elements move about the battle space. When the larger parent element is moving, screening forces can continuously move to its front, rear and or flanks along side of the parent element, or remain temporarily static through halts. Additionally screening elements may choose to bound during the screen on the flanks through alternating or successive bounds.
What is the Size of a Screening Force?
Historical examples of screens can show units as large as a division, much like the French 6th Light Armored Division during Opération Daguet which served as the Coalitions principal screening force for Operation Desert Shield in 1991, or as small as a fire team conducting a platoon/company sized operation in the jungles of Vietnam. Screening forces vary in size based on the larger unit that requires the screening. In addition a screening force is noted to have as few as possible numbers to accomplish the picking up and maintaining contact of the enemy (Economy of force). In the cases where a screen is tasked, having the smallest element possible gives the screening force added mobility to evade, and follow larger enemy elements, while picking up and harassing smaller enemy elements.
It should be noted that the screening force(s) will be as small as or smaller than and have less combat power than the estimated threat. Without this consideration the screening element could be tasked with something it cannot realistically accomplish and is doomed to defeat. If the force is larger than the anticipated threat then it could be reconsidered as an element capable of cover or guard and should be tasked as such with new commanders intent.
Where is the screen sent in relation to its larger friendly element?
The Screen is tasked and positioned based on the activity of the larger friendly element. The larger friendly element may be moving, or static itself. The larger unit has 360 degrees of potential enemy threat axis to worry about in non linear cases, or a more narrow front in linear cases and may task an element to screen to its front, flanks, or rear. In some linear cases the threat has specific axis’ and some areas may have a higher threat potential than others. The screening techniques will vary depending on the activity of the larger friendly unit and the situation at hand. The screening element needs to be far enough away from the parent element that it can provide accurate early warning, but stay close enough to be within the umbrella of its parent elements indirect fire support.
What if the enemy brings all of his friends?
The downside to a screen is that it only has small, lightly armed elements. If the enemy force is larger than friendly screening elements, the screen will not be able to disrupt the enemy force without risking its own life. It can augment size by conducting and initiating engagements at farther distances but any exposure to a larger element has an increased risk, turning a screening mission into a decisive engagement at worst or an evasion at best, which may result in a defacto loss of situational awareness, leaving your screening force useless. The Screening force has limited combat power, or potentially exhaustible resources to fight with. This may mean the best course of action (C.O.A.) is to report the situation, hide until the larger force moves past and either follow the larger enemy force at a safe distance, or continue screening in your assigned A.O. and letting the larger force go past once reported. Contingency plans should be made ahead of time with the larger unit outlining Rules of Engagement (R.O.E.) and actions to take if your screening element encounters a larger force.
What if we get into “hard” contact and fires are exchanged?
No other question is more relevant than this when firing starts. This is also the most difficult question to answer as each situation may dictate a different yet appropriate response. The critical deciding factor of action is as always the commanders intent and specifically the end state. What a Screen should not accomplish is the holding of ground or the blocking of enemy elements. This is reserved for the guard and or the cover respectively and because of your light and relatively weak task organization, you shouldn’t be expected to hold your ground. In the screen, if you find yourself engaged and the choice between holding ground or destroying the enemy requires you to lose your screening force, then RUN! You may even be able to slip away to get eyes on from another approach without firing back. Your larger element cant see or tell whats going on if your screening force is destroyed. The last caveat is a general rule for all engagements, if you become decisively engaged, meaning you cannot break contact either through your organic means or with help, then you must win the fight or die. Because of the balance between staying alive and reporting and harassing the enemy, units should practice this task often as part of their training cycle. This takes a heavy amount of small, local level leadership that usually occurs within a squad to fire team element on the small unit level and therefore requires low level leadership to not only understand how to screen, and the purpose, but also practice of exercising initiative while away from the main body in accord with the commanders intent.