Click READ ME below to see the video…
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OUtMpKt_i44
The Raid: Media Review
Click READ ME below to watch the video. There is nothing like a good crime movie to demonstrate the basic principals of the raid. The 1995 movie Heat with Robert DeNiro, Al Pacino, and Val Kilmer is a pretty good example of that…
The After Action Review (AAR) – A Primer
After Action Reviews – or AAR’s. I see them a lot on blogs and forums. People post their “AAR” of whatever product or experience they came in contact with. You typically see AAR’s on a tactical hard or soft goods and even pistol or rifle courses. This is fairly appropriate as the AAR has it’s roots as a military practice. However, most of these writings are really product reviews labeled as an AAR in an attempt to appear “in the club”. These well meaning write ups often misrepresent the end goal of a real AAR.
Sometimes, in order to describe what something is, we have to identify what it’s not.
The AAR is a tool used by leadership to improve the effectiveness of the team they lead. As the name implies, this review process takes place after the particular action has already taken place. The AAR is actually a four step process. It really is worthy of a class all to itself so we won’t be discussing how to conduct one in this article. However, we can learn from it’s basic principles. The AAR is for the benefit of the team or teams involved. It is not necessarily for those outside of that group, though we can certainly learn from the experiences of others. In order to have meaningful participation in the AAR process, you have to understand the plan that was to be carried out.
You can’t do that if you don’t know what the plan was! If you weren’t there, you don’t actively participate.
Along that note, it’s very tempting to identify what you would have done differently and how it would have changed the outcome to a more positive one. It’s very tempting to play Armchair General. A word of caution to that – your opinion likely matters very little, since you weren’t privy to the particular Operations Order that preceded whatever event you are critiquing. Your review of a situation is always tricky if you weren’t there. Even if you were, be careful. I’ve been in firefights where the guy at the other end of the line 30m away had a completely different story to tell compared to what I did. Just look at the two different accounts of the raid against UBL and those guys were practically shoulder to shoulder.
It’s easy to say what you would have done, but you didn’t experience the same thing – that’s impossible. You can use it to stimulate thought and reflect internally on how you might bring about improvement.
Now, that doesn’t mean we can’t learn from the experiences of others. We most certainly can and that is encouraged. That is a different process though and is rather personal. You are most certainly entitled to your opinion on a particular event in history. However, the AAR is most decidedly not one’s opinion. One of critical tasks for an AAR facilitator is to steer emotion out of the discussion unless it was absolutely vital in the decision making process that followed.
The AAR is about redemption and positive reinforcement for the next time. It is not a medium by which to point fingers and place blame. Anyone who facilitates a real AAR will squash this type of behavior immediately.
Storytelling is a powerful way to convey an experience. The AAR should be a safe place to share your viewpoint on the operation. Be honest, be concise. Tell your story, but be sure to make it pertinent to the rest of the group. Telling the group how awesome your reload was isn’t helpful – unless you are confirming the effectiveness of training you received. Neither is telling the group how awfully they conducted a battle drill – unless you specifically rehearsed that before hand. There is a balance you must find.
With the right leadership, an AAR can be an effective tool for continuous improvement. In the wrong hands, it’s used to place blame. It can be used by anyone from little league coaches to corporate executives. What’s important is, regardless of what review tool you choose to use, be sure that it’s done for the betterment of the group – not to absolve the leader from the responsibility. If a leader isn’t there to be a servant those under his command, no review tool including the AAR can help.
Area and Local Security: Conceptual Framing for Tactical Security Operations for Small Units
This article was submitted to another site around 2014 and was never published.
Its almost spring again in Missouri and that means brushing off the cobwebs of winter and getting back in the field to teach leadership at One Shepherds’ Warrior Leader Program. (WLP) One of the students who is slotted for their primary leader position, which is required for their One Leader tab, approached me with a question concerning the screening patrol that he’ll be conducting during this Semesters Situational Training Exercise (STX). His question however prompted me to “unpack” my answer, which is heavy.
Historically, light infantry have always accomplished tactical enabling operations of their day. Although the modern concept and verbiage of “Light Infantry” has changed, tactical enabling operations are still required and conducted to set up the conditions for offensive and defensive success. Within the wide array of tactical enabling operations, security operations are foundational pillars of required concepts to understand and employ during operations.
The Roman Velites were some of the earliest forms of organized light infantry in a professional army. Chief among their duties was providing early warning of enemy activities and locations. This task provided friendly units with enough warning in time and distance (space) to react to the enemy, enabling friendly units to develop the situation with eyes and ears while main forces prepared and reacted to the changing stimulus. These units conducted security operations to the front, flanks, and rear of the larger force, moving forward of the main battle formation. This task illustrates “Local Security,” that is protecting the main body.
One of the means by which Velites would provide even more time and space was through the engagement of enemy elements with stand off weapons like the javelin, peppering battle lines of opposing troops and then withdrawing through their main friendly lines once their ordnance was thrown out or they encountered a heavier unit. By this limited means, Velites could draw combat power away from enemy elements, and force them to expend “combat power” or in other terms , firepower, manpower, maneuver, protection and information. By exhausting their opponents resources and energy the screening force could drain the enemy before the battle with main troops started.
Small in numbers and purposely augmented to have minimum equipment, these screening troops could utilize speed and mobility to their advantage. This however, meant that because of their relatively few numbers and little protection in both armor and in distance to robust line units, they were increasingly vulnerable to standard line infantry and cavalry units.
These Light Fighters were also tasked forward of the main body as vanguards as well as flank and rear security during administrative movements from bivouac to bivouac and during tactical approach marches and maneuvers. The concept of having security forces between their main body and the enemy enabled the Roman Army to develop the situation around them, provide early warning of enemy maneuver and enabled the disruption of attacks all while buying time and space for the larger main body to react and maneuver. While stationary in bivouac light units were tasked in guarding area water supplies away from camp, or main access roads that lead to the bivouac itself. This concept illustrates the focus of the area around the unit,which the unit intends or may need to utilize in order to further their objectives and not the unit itself, which developed the concept of “Area Security.”
Although Distances in between units during combat have changed due to technology, the need for Security Operations still exist. As mentioned above, one of the main categories of Enabling Operations is that of Security Operations.
There are two types of “Tactical Security Operations” (TSO) which are Area Security, and Local Security. BLUFOR doctrine stresses that all units provide their own local security from within the unit itself (organic) at each level down to the buddy team. Area Security, however is usually an assigned mission by a larger element to an adjacent or subordinate element. They are denoted in difference nominally by the distance to which the security element is operating from the main body and what its attempting to secure. Local security limits the distance a security element may be pushed out, focusing on protecting the unit itself. Some environmental aspect in which the unit deems “key” or decisive” may also be tasked to achieve the protection of the organic unit but the focus is still on preventing surprise actions by an enemy against the main unit. Local Security aims to protect the element itself, while Area Security encompasses features, both man made and natural, that influence the elements ability to conduct operations within its assigned area of operation. (A.O.) Area Security focuses on controlling or monitoring key terrain, which will give the force a marked advantage in operations, and or decisive terrain, which is terrain that will make or break the success of your operation.
In this example, the LP/OP’s serve as local security while the three moving patrols serve as area security.
The placement of these units is dictated by the principals of METT-TC and OCOKA.
Area security
- Pro: Elements have larger distances between them and the main body
- Enables earlier time for warning
- Enables more space for reaction and maneuver
- Protects valuable features other than but not limited from the main body
- Con: Elements have larger ground to cover
- Requires more people
- May require more specialized equipment
- Smaller recon and infiltration teams can penetrate through and around gaps between units
- Requires robust coordination between friendly elements who may be both static and moving
Local security
- Pro: Elements have a shorter distances between them and the main body
- Less gaps in the security enables spotting of smaller units
- Requires less people
- Lower strain on equipment and supplies (distance to communicate and to resupply is less)
- Eases coordination by shorting time and space.
- Economy of force is maximized due to distance
- Con: Elements have a shorter ground to cover
- Less early warning time
- Less space for reaction and maneuver
- Larger units may outrun or overwhelm local security forces
Both Area and Local concepts achieve their end state through three separate forms of TSO; screen, guard, cover, which all entail progressively higher levels of capability and requirements. These three categories employ a variety of tactics, techniques, and procedures to achieve success. Lastly what may look like Local Security to a large element may be an Area Security to the smaller element tasked. It should be noted that at all times within BLUFOR doctrine, every element no matter the size is required to establish and maintain continual local security. Security is a critical enabler in all operations and without it, effort and lives are lost.
Communications Breakdown: Part 1
The ability to communicate effectively is arguably the most important asset to any entity seeking to obtain a certain goal. Without communication the ability to relay ideas and goals to coworkers and teammates is nullified. Without properly conveying these ideas and goals to our team we fail to reach enabling and terminal objectives. It is not enough to simply open up a line of communication for the purposes of light fighting. A Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) must be established in order to make communications seamless and proficient. Establishing a pattern or sequence for communication allows us to communicate successfully with other teammates. Standardizing communication is especially important because we may not even know those receiving our message very well. If communication was not standardized, efficiencies of time and message would be lost.
Communication is used in order to coordinate and assign tasks, as well as to maintain situational awareness of teams. In several circumstances we seek to keep our communications proprietary; couples do not openly discuss their finances, businesses try to keep their newest ideas secret from their competitors so that they may gain advantage in the marketplace. The idea of shielding one’s communication is evident in almost any situation in which communication is involved. In the military, this idea is condensed to Operational Security (OPSEC). In communications, OPSEC is maintained through the application of Cryptology; the study of codes.
In World War II, the Japanese could virtually decipher every code the United States was using to communicate, thus operational success suffered. The Japanese knew when, where, and what U.S. forces planned to do as a result of the compromised communications. It does not matter how big a hammer you have, if your opponent knows when and where you plan to use it, that hammer is rendered ineffective. The introduction of the Navajo Code Talkers by U.S. forces effectively secured communications against Japanese Intelligence.
The Navajo Code Talker’s Dictionary is an example of Signal Operating Instructions (SOI). An SOI decreases the time on the net (radio frequency) by shortening the length of messages and, more importantly, allowing the user to communicate in a secure manner on an otherwise insecure net. The complexity of an SOI varies depending on the mission and unit. For instance, the nature of one mission may require a large amount of time when radio communications are forbidden. In other words, the unit needs to maintain radio silence so as not to alert the opposing forces of friendly activity. Some prefer a short SOI with just a few brevity codes, while others prefer a more robust and comprehensive SOI. The contemporary age has afforded advances in cryptology that have made this form of communication all but obsolete. Encrypted radio signals no longer require militaries to code their messages when facing a less technologically advanced enemy. Regardless, there are several instances where this technology can fail or be rendered obsolete. Plus, not everyone has access to top-of-the-line communications equipment. Thus, the study and use of an SOI is still quite valuable; especially in a leadership capacity.
One of the most noticeable traits of good leaders is their ability to communicate effectively. This entails the ability to express their vision through Commander’s Intent (CI) as well as disseminate information under stress. In One Shepherd’s Technical Institute of Leadership, we apply the use of SOI during training to not only shield communications from the Opposing Force (OPFOR), but also to facilitate our student leaders in learning how to communicate effectively under stress. Using an SOI in stressful situations forces the user to condense the message down to its simplest form. Thus, teaching leaders the art of clear and concise communication. In order for leaders to apply the use of SOI, they must first learn its composition and how to employ it.
So what goes into an SOI? Due to the comprehensive nature of this topic, this article will condense the information into five main points; Call Signs, SOI Timeline, Encryption Code/ Authentication Table, Passwords, and Brevity Codes. An example of SOI will help gain a more comprehensive understanding of its use.
Example format of the “required” information in an SOI.
Not every member of the patrol carries a radio, but every member must be familiar with the SOI should they be the one to need to communicate using the radio. Part 1 of this article will focus on the portions that every member of the patrol must be familiar with as they are explicitly non-radio based – the SOI Timeline and Passwords.
SOI Timeline:
This section is rather intuitive. By extensive use of the same SOI, the opposition is allotted the time and repetitiveness to decipher our SOI. Thus, an SOI is only used for a designated time; often 24 hours. In the above timeline, you should observe that the SOI is in effect starting at 071630SNOV14. This is a Date Time Group (DTG) of the form DDHHMMT MM YY. So the first part “07” represents the 7th day. The next four numbers represent the time “1630” or 4:30 P.M. Next we have “S” which is the Time Zone designator for Central Time. “NOV” represents the month of November and finally “14” indicates the year 2014. So putting everything together we get that the date time group is saying that the SOI will go in effect at 16:30 Central time on the 7th of November, 2014.
Passwords:
When linking up with another unit, each other, or simply making contact with another person in the field, it is imperative to immediately identify whether they are “friend or foe”. We do this through Challenge and Passwords. An all too familiar Challenge and Password is that of the Allied forces during WWII – Thunder and Flash. The movie Saving Private Ryan contains several classic examples of passage of lines. Passage of lines is conducted several times with the Challenge and Password to confirm the identity of each other. This film contains a fatal flaw. When giving a challenge and password it would be extremely easy to pick-up the challenge of ‘thunder’ and the password of ‘flash’. The proper (more secure) way of conducting the challenge and password would be to incorporate the two words into a sentence. Using the example table from above, it may look something like this:
Challenge
“Halt! Did you find the Badger in the garden?”
Password
“Nah, but we did locate a Priest so that Joe can go to confession”
The incorporation of the Challenge and Password into a sentences make it less obvious to a spy/ scout/ or enemy nearby. Another important step to this process is to inform the challenger of how many people you have with you so they may count them in. This is a procedure used to maintain a unit head count as well as keep an enemy spy from infiltrating your patrol; however unlikely it may be. Sometimes we know that we are going to make contact with another unit and we do not have the time and luxury of stopping and having this dialogue. In situations like this, we use what we call a running password. When using a running password you continuously yell out the word AND the number of people you have with you. A fellow warrior you are running towards hears you call out the running password, he knows you are friendly and that you are in a hurry. Secondly, he hears you call out a number and he knows how many friendlies are following you. For instance, you hear “Popcorn 5, Popcorn 5…” You know that 5 friendlies are coming in. Any one after that is considered an enemy.
“One, Two, Three, Four, and Five……… wait Six? (BANG!!!)”
The other password you see in the table is the number combination. With the number combination, the sum of the challenge and password must equal the designated number. Above we have the number combination of “Five”. The challenge can be anything less than five and the password has to be the number that creates the sum of five (i.e. – Challenge “2”, so Password is “3”; 2+3 = 5). While not necessarily required, you should incorporate these numbers into a sentence similar to the Challenge and Password from before. Using the same number combination, 5, it may look something like this:
Challenge
“Halt! Did you get those 4 apples I asked for?
Password
“Yes, and I found 1 raccoon too!”
Here we can see that 4 and 1 add to make 5, thus completing the number combination. While you can standardize when, or even if, you use each type of password, the general rule of thumb is that number combinations are used behind enemy lines and the Challenge and Password is used behind friendly lines.
Conclusion: Part 1
Every member of the patrol should be familiar with the Timeline and Password portions of the SOI. These basic building blocks should be rehearsed prior to step off and the patrol leader should quiz the members of the patrol on these two areas during the pre-combat inspection (PCI). Without these communication control measures in place, the entire operation can be compromised should an enemy sneak into your patrol. Even worse is avoidable fratricide. Learn and practice these basic concepts first, and you’ll be well on your way to maintaining solid communications with your team.
The SLLS Hault – Media Review
Know Your Gear – Sighting Systems
One of the most crucial parts of any weapon is the sighting system. Without an ability to align the weapon with the intended target, the deployment of that weapon can be disappointingly fruitless. Examining the various systems available can help you select the most appropriate one for your application and needs.
Hand-Eye
Although early thrown or hurled weapons had no mechanical sighting system, there was a system that is still in use today with modern weapons. Simple hand eye coordination is used to launch a weapon at its intended target. The downside to this primitive method is the training and practice required to become effective enough. But once learned, it is a proven reliable system. There is nothing mechanically to fail or lose, unless the human body itself is damaged.
This method is still applicable to modern firearms. Holding the fore grip of a rifle with the index finger extended along the bore of the rifle is an expedient alignment method for night time engagements. Simply establish the four points of contact with the rifle as normal and “point” to your intended target.
Self-defense marksmanship, typically with a pistol, employs this method. Unless your profession affords you the ability to practice with tens of thousands of rounds a year for many years, most people will default to simply pointing their pistol at the threat and squeezing the trigger, even if they have taken a few pistol classes. The more “primitive” brain takes over. No front-sight focus, no ball in a cup, no 3 dots aligned – simply point and shoot.
Iron Sights
By nature of the design of firearms, there has always been somewhat of a built in sighting system – the barrel itself. Notch and post type iron sights added to the barrel allow a greater fidelity of alignment, especially with longer barrels.
Sight radius is an important consideration when using iron sights. Any perceived offset between the front sight and the rear sight becomes more difficult to predict the closer the two are. Conversely, a longer sight radius affords the user the ability to detect small deviations in alignment. This basic principle holds true regardless of the style or shape of the front and rear sights.
There are a few considerations when choosing the style of iron sights. Fixed vs. folding, rear sight shape and front post width, and even self-illuminating sights.
Fixed sights rarely “break” or fall off and seldom jostled out of alignment. Folding sights on the other hand, are not typically integral to the structure of the weapon. They have a greater chance of falling off or shifting relative to the bore due to impacts or thermal expansion and contraction of the various components. They do however provide a low profile and therefore less chance of snagging on your gear or the environment around you. This makes them suitable as a backup to a primary optic system.
Rear sight selection basically comes down to a grove or a hole. Grooved rear sights are lower profile and generally work better in low light. One downside is that the top surface that the top of the front sight post is to align to, tends to gets indistinctively blurry. It’s hard to decisively tell where the top of the rear sight is, especially when it’s intended to be blurry in relation to the front sight. This is due to the difference in what is known as the umbra and penumbra – the primary and secondary shadows that form.
Circular or diamond shaped rear sights, allow the eye to more naturally find center of the intentionally blurry rear aperture. However, because of the nature of an aperture, it limits the amount of light from the target area that can enter the eye. These systems often remedy this by including a daytime (smaller) and a nighttime (larger) aperture that is flipped or rotated in exchange for the other.
The front post width is also important. Too wide and you lose the ability to determine the exact center of the post, and therefore where the round will impact. Too narrow and it becomes difficult to quickly pick up in a “must shoot right now” situation. As a general rules of thumb, the longer the expected target, the narrower the front sight post.
Wider than ideal front sight posts can be sighted-in in such a way that the left or right corners of the front post become the impact point at longer ranges. This method still makes the system accurate at close ranges as the adjustment necessary is of negligible effect.
Optical Sights
Optical sights, magnified or not, allow the focal plane of the eye to be on the target rather than the front sight post. This makes target acquisition and weapon alignment more natural as the eye does not have to rapidly change focal planes. A reticle or other shapes are used to align the optic, and therefore weapon, with the target.
Non-magnified optics, allow for a natural transition from iron sights. It should be noted that optics do not necessarily make the shooter more inherently accurate. Much like the misconception with visible lasers, without proper fundamentals, they just allow the shooter to watch their point of impact shift suddenly off target the instant just before the shot breaks.
With proper fundamentals, non-magnified optics like red dots or rings allow for fast engagement, particularly of targets within 300 meters. Dot size can become an issue as larger dots may cover the entire target at ranges beyond 200 meters resulting in an ambiguous impact point. As such these are more typically used for relatively close engagements. Also, as these are often battery powered, reliability becomes an issue. Batteries die, lenses crack or fog.
Magnified optics allow for target detection at longer rangers. Usually 300-400 meters and beyond. As such, they are typically mounted to weapons capable of effective fire at those ranges. They can be passive, or have battery powered or other self-illuminating features. Usually, because of their bulk and relative sensitivity, they are typically associated with special purpose weapons that maximize their benefit. As such this limits the speed at which they can be employed at shorter ranges. This can be mitigated by using them in conjunction with offset red-dots or iron sights, but at the cost of weight and bulk.
Electro-Optical
Electro-Optical sights amplify ambient light and/or convert an invisible band of the electromagnetic spectrum into a visible. They typically convert the infrared (heat) spectrum. These systems both gather light from the target using lenses, and focus it to a receiver that amplifies or converts that signal onto a display that is then sent through lenses towards the user’s eye. They can be magnified or not.
The most common and familiar is night vision. The familiar green image is the output of an image intensifier. The human eye is able to distinguish the most variance amongst shades of green, and as such green was chosen as the output. Night vision systems amplify ambient light as well as detect infrared light. These systems are either passive or active by means shining an infrared light not visible to the naked eye, towards the target. The IR light effectively “paints” the target allowing the image intensifier to further enhance the image.
This technology has undergone many generations and advancements that are much too technical for the scope of this article. In general the system can be face mounted or weapon mounted. Face mounted solutions allow for target detection whereas weapon mounted solutions afford target engagement.
Although there are “auto-gated” features available for use in changing light conditions, these sights are limited to night time use. Additionally because of their limited service life, expense, and sensitivity, they are often restricted to special purpose weapons and forces. They are removed for daylight operations.
Thermal sights operate in a similar manner except they amplify and convert heat signatures into a visual representation, typically black and white. “White hot” or “black hot” settings are available, allowing the temperature gradient to be displayed per the user’s preference. These systems rely on contrasting heat signatures between a warm target and its cooler background.
Unlike night vision systems though, they allow for rapid target acquisition as warm targets are practically highlighted for the user. These systems are highly sensitive and extremely cost prohibitive. There are even systems that combine night vision and thermal imagery. Be prepared to drop as much as a decent new car on these systems.
Conclusion
Each system has its own advantages and disadvantages. Each should be carefully weighted to the environment you will be operating in. Just because elite forces have expensive sighting systems, that doesn’t necessarily mean you will see a benefit if you start using it too. Weight your needs and desires against factors of cost and reliability and the benefit you perceive.
If I could, I’d have one of each.
Know Your Gear: Sticks & Stones – Force-on-Force Platforms
The phrase “practice makes perfect” has become commonplace and for good reason. There is no better way to improve a skill than by actually doing it. This mantra also rings true when it comes to armed combatives. Throughout history warriors have used “force on force” sparring to train for battle. It’s no surprise that well-practiced warriors have proven infinitely superior.
Today battles are fought with modern firearms – pistol, carbine, rifle and various crew-served weapon systems like the venerable machine gun. Warriors still train with their weapons, and weapon facsimile just as warriors such as the Samurai used wooden sticks to practice swordsmanship.
There are a handful of weapon simulation platforms available for force-on-force training. I have been lucky enough to train extensively with each of the major simulation platforms over the years, and will offer an assessment of each system. This includes Paintball, Airsoft, Simunition®, MILES and Nerf. Yep, even Nerf.
To assess any system we need to establish our metrics. We’ll use a rating system of ten points. Our five metrics include cost, realism, range, feedback, and safety.
(1.) Cost of the system is pretty self-explanatory, but we’ll try to include information regarding the purchase, operation, and upkeep expenses. (2.) Realism includes both the look and feel of the weapon simulation platform, but also the level of stress induced. (3.) Range includes the distance a shooter can expect a 50/50 chance of hitting a human-sized torso while under fire. (4.) Feedback involves how the simulation platform indicates a hit on an opponent. (5.) Safety, our last but arguably most important category explores the inherent risks to the users.
Nerf = 3.5 Rating
I started wargaming at a young age when my mom bought me my first Nerf guns. Large sofa forts were constructed and neighborhood kids gathered for epic dart wars in the trenches of La-Z Boys. Now at the time, I definitely did not consider my Nerf battles to be a representation of battle. However as I recollect, if it wasn’t force-on-force training then what was it?
As a simulation platform Nerf is overall quite lousy. The realism is poor and Nerf is clearly a flimsy toy with no stress value. The effective range is about 5 meters, tops. There is virtually no feedback as the Nerf dart leaves no mark and inflicts no pain. Yet given those obvious shortcomings, Nerf guns are very affordable to purchase and maintain, and are a hellacious amount of fun! Nerf is quite safe when used with any pair of sunglasses and it allows junior warriors hours of trigger time.
Paintball = 5.5 Rating
As I grew older I yearned for a new and more exciting game of war. This came to me in the form of my first job at a local Paintball field, where I quickly became a proficient and regular player. I was able to play so much Paintball that in just a couple years’ time I was playing at a professional level and was sponsored in national tournaments around the country with the KC Impact, Explicit Content, and Diesel teams. I really enjoyed the small unit micro-tactics of “shoot, move, and communicate” that were so essential to Paintball.
The cost of Paintball is middle of the road at several hundred dollars for the marker and protective gear, plus up to $100 for a single day’s game. The realism of the marker is low, but the stress induced is very high because a Paintball hit leaves a painful bruised welt. Range is also midland with an effective range of about 60 meters. Feedback receives a high rating because the Paintball breaks on the opponent leaving a mark. And when used properly with the required protective equipment, safety receives a middle score as well – although there have been rare cases of eye injury due to improper use.
Airsoft = 6 Rating
I continued to develop into even more of a “war nerd.” I started looking for something that was more realistic than Paintball so I joined the Kansas City Airsoft Association, a military simulation (MilSim) community. It was through Airsoft MilSim that I was finally able to sink my teeth into the fire and maneuver of battlefield tactics.
An Airsoft gun runs several hundred dollars and there is a slight amount of maintenance involved. Cost savings come in the very affordable ammunition of 6mm plastic BBs – making a daylong game very affordable. The realism of Airsoft is superior as most guns are 1:1 replicas in size and nearly the same weight. Airsoft hit produces a more modest sting than Paintball, but is still stress inducing. Yet the weakness of Airsoft in realism is that it sounds like a racecar toy when it fires. Very disappointing. Range is also limited at an effective distance of just 60 meters. And there is virtually no feedback to the shooter because the plastic BB leaves no mark. Safety is good if the proper protective goggles are used, although there has been an occasional eye or tooth injury when improperly protected.
Simunition® = 6.5 Rating
As my experience expanded into “real steel” firearms and tactical training I joined Summit Tactical, a community of law enforcement and security professionals that focused on the tactical use of firearms. Through this community I was afforded the opportunity to use Simunition® – a sort of hybrid between Paintball and blank ammunition. Simunition® rounds use gunpowder to project a plastic paint filled bullet from a simulated firearm upper attached to an actual firearm. Military, law enforcement and security teams often use Simunition® for force-on-force engagement training.
The Simunition® system is prohibitively expensive, costing as much as an actual firearm. They are relatively affordable to maintain, however the real expense is in the ammunition with can run $1.75 per round. That said, Simunition® receives top scores for realism because it employs the lower half of the firearm it is simulating. And painful hits on target create a stressful training situation. Ranges of 45 meters are acceptable for pistols, but lackluster for rifles and carbines. Simunition® does leave a mark on the target, offering good feedback. But it is known to sometimes over-penetrate. Given the relatively small numbers of professionals using this platform, it has produced a small but worrisome number of injuries.
MILES 2000/IWS = 8 Rating
My path through gaming and toward more serious training led me eventually to One Shepherd. This training institution uses immersive tactical gaming in military simulation to teach the constructs and processes of leadership. This struck me as a strange approach, and although I was initially hesitant I participated in my first event and I was hooked for life.
One Shepherd employs the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System in its fourth generation (MILES 2000/IWS). MILES gear is an eye-safe laser that is fastened to an actual firearm. The firearm uses blank ammunition and a blank firing adaptor. The laser is activated by a combination of light from the muzzle blast plus an internal mercury switch that detects the recoil of the weapon.
Yet the purchase and maintenance of MILES is so excessive that it is the only simulation platform to receive a flat zero for costs. The blank ammunition keeps operational costs similar to paintball expenses. Realism receives high marks because MILES is used in conjunction with real firearms, including the flash and recoil of blank ammunition. And while there is no pain involved, experienced warriors still find themselves under considerable stress when the “near miss” tone beeps during the chaotic noise of battle. Engagement ranges are phenomenally good, easily engaging targets at 400 meters and even out to 800 meters (a half mile) with small arms weapons. Feedback provides not only “near miss” and “kill” shots, but identifies who shot whom and with what weapon system. Even hit/miss statistics are available. Finally, safety is very good because MILES emits nothing more than an eye-safe beam of light.
MILES deserves a further mention in this article because it is the only integrated system on our list. That means tanks, helicopters, rocket launchers and crew served weapons are fitted with MILES to engage targets at realistic ranges – even miles away. No other simulation platform can accomplish this because they all involve projectiles, and the energy necessary to achieve such ranges would be consistently lethal to exposed warriors at close range.
Keep in mind that no simulation platform is perfect. When firearm simulation behaves exactly like a bullet, it is fatal. So imperfection is the price we pay for safe, non-lethal force-on-force simulation.
I am reminded of the childhood taunt “sticks and stones may break my bones” – yes, but bullets usually kill. And harm is not the intent of weapon simulation. The purpose of any force-on-force simulation platform is to offer as realistic combative experiences as we can afford. When taken seriously any of the aforesaid platforms can be beneficial to warrior training.
Beyond the Square Range
I find myself watching videos on YouTube again. Most of the time it points me towards videos of firearms training or competition. Not surprising since that is one of my interests. I’m always amazed how proficient the top competitors are. Whether it’s IDPA, IPSC, or 3-Gun, I usually end up finding videos where my jaw hits the floor. The speed and accuracy they are able to achieve is absolutely mind-boggling. As an occasional competitor myself, I can certainly appreciate the level of training and dedication it took to get where they are.
The tactical trainers are just as impressive. The biggest difference of course, is they generally demonstrate their skill while wearing more practical and tactical equipment. There are no race guns; no special shot shell loaders – just practical firearms and equipment.
There is something amazing about watching a Steel Challenge shooter hit 5 plates scattered about in just a few seconds. Watching guys decked out in full armor punch out of a vehicle blasting an array of steel targets while flash-bangs go off is just down right cool.
However, what I like about these videos is also what I despise. Is this what the peak of firearms training looks like? Well, why shouldn’t it be? These people are international champions – quite literally Grand Masters at what they do. The tactical trainers are often combat veterans, guys who have been there and done that. Of course we can learn something from them. But to what end?
If competition is your bag, then its obvious that path of training will lead you to a level of marksmanship and speed unlike any other game in firearms. Yes – game. I don’t mean that as a pejorative. Not at all. Really. It’s perfectly okay to be a professional baseball player. Why shouldn’t it be okay to be good at a game involving firearms?
I know what some of you are thinking. I agree that there are skills that can be learned from competition that can apply to a real world gunfighting situation. However, it’s not difficult to see that its a game. First, there are rules. The targets don’t shoot back. They behave predictably. The majority of the time, the competitor is allowed to walk the course. They get to know where all the targets are, where to stand, what target activates movement on another target. They get to plan their round count and at exactly which moment they will reload. It’s fairly clear this a game.
Now the tactical trainers seem to approach things a bit differently. Most of what I’ve seen focuses around a series of drills. Drills aren’t bad. Drills are good. They allow us to refine those tactile skills necessary to become a good shooter. But again to what end? It seems as though most trainers would have you believe that their culmination exercise or evolution is the moment where the purpose of their training becomes clear. Is it? By no fault of their own, most customers are led to believe so.
I’ve seen too many videos in which a shooting skill is applied by placing the shooter in a scenario where they are told to conduct a battle drill – without ever explaining the purpose of the battle drill. Neither do they explain the decision matrix. In short, they don’t tell the shooter why they are there or what they must assess.
Unfortunately, the result is a shooter who has a warped understanding of gunfighting and patrolling. No one second guesses why they are to engage and advance towards an overwhelming force of paper and steel targets in the middle of an open field all the while transitioning to pistols and clearing malfunctions with only the non-dominate hand. That is a poor tactical decision and is not an accurate representation of a gunfight at all.
I’ll suggest that is analogous to teaching someone who knows nothing of baseball how to hit a grand slam one-handed in the last inning of the World Series. It’s absurd.
In the shooting scenario above, wounded and hopelessly outgunned, my battle buddy and I would break contact and seek a new angle of attack. Anyone who would think otherwise is a grossly irresponsible leader that I wouldn’t follow. Don’t try to sell me a highly specialized skill as if it were a standard skill set of gunfighting.
Don’t get me wrong. I am not implying that instructors are intentionally negligent or malicious. For them, I imagine it is the best way they know to push shooting skills to the point of failure. It makes sense to create a high stress environment to test student manipulation skills and marksmanship. Yet unknowingly these instructors are providing a severe disservice. Students may walk away with unreasonable expectations of such unorthodox skills.
What is needed is a better contextual understanding of where and how these skills might apply. In order for that to happen battle drills need to be taught and understood – immediate action battle drills like hasty attack, break contact, and react to ambush. The problem is, that doesn’t sell.
People come to shoot their rifles. Most of the training is done in a classroom setting and square, one-directional range. In the “wowee” appeal of stress shooting, students are left with a unrealistic idea of gunfighting and tactics in general.
It is said that amateurs worry about tactics, while professionals worry about logistics. I think there is something to that sentiment.
Allow me to stretch that model into the current topic to suggest that amateur shooters worry about hitting the mark, while professional shooters worry about training objectives.
If we concern ourselves only with weapon manipulation and shooting skills, an admittedly a small percentage of warrior tasks and competencies, then we’re fooling ourselves. We’re putting people in scenarios without any regard for contextual understanding. As instructors we’ve then failed our students because we’ve established unrealistic gunfighting expectations for our students without teaching the warrior competencies of situational awareness and decision-making.
Always ask why. If your instructor cannot explain the context of the problem and its decision points – its time to find a new instructor.
This article was originally published on odjournal.com (Olive Drab: the journal of tactics) and has been transferred here with permission.