Full Spectrum Training: Which conflict…this one, or the next?

by Matt GedersWarriorshipPosted on Comments are Disabled

A warrior who picks up too many stones, soon drops all of them. – Native American proverb

I’ve heard the grumbling for a handful of years now. This mild dissention is understandable. An artillery captain in the 10th Mountain Division at Ft. Drum, NY tells me his troops train so little on their guns that they can barely pass their firing battery.

Two NCO squad leaders serving in the 3rd Infantry Divisions at Ft. Hood, TX complained that their troops no longer train for dismounted patrols. They insisted that many Soldiers pull four years of service and never again put on face camouflage after they complete the School of the Infantry.

Another periodical recently printed a story titled “Is Ranger School still relevant?” Not surprisingly the active-duty Soldiers offering expert perspectives eventually opined that yes, Ranger School is still relevant and necessary. But they were quick to agree that after ten years of war, few Soldiers required any particular school for promotion points – or even to improve the way they conduct the business of prosecuting the current wars. Indeed, one Ranger insisted that the unique focus on dismounted patrolling operations during Ranger School seemed a bit of an anachronism in light of today’s mechanized and motorized urban operations.

The question as to where training should be focused is an important one. I certainly don’t mean to make light of it. Yet each time this conversation comes up, I’m reminded of something my mother said years ago about the women’s liberation movement. A former newspaper editor and field archivist for the State of Missouri, she insisted, “A woman can have it all! She can be a student, mother, wife, lover, professional, home keeper, educator and green-thumb in her own garden. But not all at one time. No one can wear that many hats at once. It takes a lifetime.”

Perhaps there is wisdom in this approach to training for the full spectrum of military operations.

Full Spectrum Operations (FSO) might best be described as a continuum from sustainable peace to total warfare between to industrialized states or non-state antagonists. Our Armed Forces train for each phase of that continuum. Why? Because the separate phases are not static, that is, each phase can quickly escalate up to a higher level of violence, or it may ratchet down in conflict toward a steadier and sustainable peace. Our Soldiers, Marines, Airmen and Sailors are expected to perform competently and professionally in all phases of FSO.

Although there are numerous phases and even hybrid phases of FSO, it might be easier to think of it in a four-phased continuum – Kinetic Operations, Counterinsurgency, Stability Operations, and Peace Operations.

Kinetic Operations

This is maneuver warfare in its most advanced form. It might entail “total war” between two or more industrialized nations such as the last world war when militaries bombed entire cities of their enemy. In more recent years it has at least been the means by which one military gains entrance into another region or state, such as the United Nations coalition during the Persian Gulf War.

Counterinsurgency

Along with Kinetic Operations (KO), counterinsurgency (COIN) makes up what we think of a “traditional” military operations. Under the definition of COIN falls a wide variety of conflict, from internal insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, to border conflicts and infiltrating forces meant to disrupt the legitimate government. Such conflicts may occur both with or without the help of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) from another nation, coalition or cause.

Stability Operations

In the wake of either KO, COIN or even natural disaster, Stability And Reconstruction Operations (SARO, formerly SASO) conduct every conceivable mission from transportation and security support to humanitarian refugee relief, to political election support, to economic reconstruction under such Other Government Agencies (OGA) as US Department of State Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) and Non-Government Agencies (NGA) like the International Monetary Fund (IMF). SARO becomes an alphabet soup of agencies and organizations attempting restore sustainable peace, health and prosperity to a damaged region or nation.

Clearly the US military takes something of a backseat as shaping and sustaining operations during SARO, and allows NGO/OGA to take the lead on the decisive operations. Yet this sort of unfathomable coordination requires substantial training.

Peace Operations

If any time during SARO and COIN stability is lost to unrest, the situation may quickly escalate to KO. In general terms that level of violence is perceived to be a unacceptable outcome. And even though in the short run KO might remove a dangerous adversary, violence is not sustainable indefinitely. In short, the solution requires more than just military might.

The implied strategic objective then is to move toward Peace Operations (PO). Along with SARO, PO makes up what is called Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW, pronounced “moo-twah”), to use the proper vernacular.

Yet PO, too, is very complicated and takes many forms. Peacekeeping, for example, involves the use of foreign troops to a region or nation when one or more of the adversarial parties invites said peackeepers in. This is quite another matter from Peace Enforcement whereby the foreign military forcibly enters the region to put down violent unrest.

Peacekeepers are highly regulated and highly limited in terms of their mission as well as their rules of engagement (ROE). After all, they have been invited into the region for specified task. Peace Enforcement has considerably less limitation on its mission or ROE, and so tends to see more immediate results. By way of example, consider the depressingly ineffective United Nations Peacekeeping mission to Bosnia in the early 1990s, compared to the very effective NATO Peace Enforcement in Bosnia just four years later.

Again, whether we’re talking traditional military operations such as KO and COIN, or MOOTW such as SARO and PO – each of these missions require careful preparation and training on the part of our military.

Why train for MOOTW missions? Because if we instead enter these endeavors half-heartedly we slip into what is colloquially called mission creep that ends in debacles such as the 1983 Beirut Bombing or the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu. Our military force loses its focus and finds itself engulfed in quagmire.

Yet with training, our military enjoys the prestige and confidence of successful operations such as in Banda Aceh, Indonesia after the devastating natural disaster of a tsunami. Too, we’ve enjoyed recent successes in quelling the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo while seeking workable solutions.

The Current Priority

So where are we today? Policymakers have clearly and perhaps wisely chosen to address the conflict we’re facing right now, immediately.

This means that the focus is now on the various missions lower on the FSO continuum, being COIN, SARO and PO. Indeed, other than future weapon development projects that continue to see their budgets cut, little effort at all has been placed on training for KO. Funding for curriculum development, training facility and training schedules have all but turned their back on traditional warfighting skill sets.

Frustrations due to this policy are felt all the way around. Leaders within the theaters of operation demand less funding for future stealth technology for the Navy and Air Force, and more funds to prosecute the development of their Areas Of Responsibility (AOR). Likewise, career Soldiers understand that the Contemporary Operating Picture (COP) is a temporary snap shot in time. It has changed in recent years, and will change again soon enough. They want to divide the resources in order to achieve some semblance of balance in training for FSO.

It’s easy to appreciate the argument. It’s much more difficult to employ a solution that satisfies everyone.

On one hand, we have the historic image of the numerically superior French army at Agincourt. They were excellent at waging battle with their heavy cavalry, virtually unbeaten until that October day in 1415. Unwilling to recognize that the battle in front of them had changed drastically with the introduction of the English longbow archer, the French continue to fight the fight they wanted rather than to do what was necessary to win! And of course it ended disastrously for the French.

On the other hand, we have the historic image of waning Roman Empire and the relaxing of the standards for its once powerful and capable Legions. Once the sharpness of its armies were lost, so too were the Empire’s diplomatic and economic forms of coercion. Soon after, Rome itself would fall to invasion at the hands of more powerful armies.

While no nation lasts forever, not even the great social-political experiment called the United States of America, prudence might suggest we employ the wisdom of our elders. Just as no woman can be all things to all people at a single point in time, perhaps no military is meant to handle the entire spectrum of conflict at a single point in time.

My colleagues over at Gun Control International (http://guncontrolintl.com), a weapon skills training company that hosts exchange training courses with One Shepherd, has a simple motto: “Training is not an option. It is a way of life.”

I appreciate that sentiment because it suggests that there is no pinnacle peak to reach in training. There is no time or place or measure that we come to as warriors where we can say, “Okay, now I know enough to stop learning.”

Training is an ongoing lifetime pursuit. We train for the conflict at hand, first and foremost. We also build training for future conflicts. And if we’re very clever in our training programs, we’re careful not to unlearn the lessons of our past conflicts.

This article was originally published on odjournal.com (Olive Drab: the journal of tactics) and has been transferred here with permission.

 

Principles of War: Tactical guidance for small unit leaders

by Matt GedersLeadershipPosted on Comments are Disabled

The brilliance of Carl von Clausewitz’s essay Principles of War (1812) is that his words are as relevant today as they were 200 years ago. This work places Clausewitz, along with Sun Tzu, as one of the most quoted military philosophers of all time.

Yet Clausewitz was not the only military philosopher of his day. We’d be remiss if we failed to mention a contemporary of Clausewitz, the military philosopher Antoine-Henri Jomini. Clausewitz and Jomini make for an interesting comparison and contrast.

Jomini, a Swiss officer, fought under Napoleon Bonaparte. From the French and Swiss military traditions we might guess that Jomini would be more descriptive in his approach to military philosophy. Not at all. Instead, the able Jomini takes a very prescriptive approach, giving specific guidance to the array of combat power, the formation of troops, and how, when and where artillery is to be employed.

As such, Jomini’s observations were extremely relevant to the tactics and technology of his day. Indeed, one could argue that if we were to attempt to extract the underlying principles of Jomini’s prescriptive guidance, his philosophy would still be relevant. Perhaps.

Clausewitz, by comparison, was a Prussian soldier who eventually obtained a commission as an officer (championed by junior ranking warriors for having started his career as an enlisted troop). Clausewitz fought under the Russian banner against Napoleon’s Grand Army.

Again, from the Germanic military traditions we might expect Clausewitz to be equally prescriptive as Jomini in his approach to military philosophy. Not at all. Instead, we see quite the opposite. Clausewitz is descriptive rather than prescriptive in his approach, offering guidance as to the conditions that lend themselves to battlefield victory.

What follows then are the 9 Principles of War as interpreted by the US Army. Expressly because Clausewitz was descriptive in his approach, other militaries vary somewhat in their interpretations of the Principles of War. Yet for our sake we’ll stick with the American interpretation.

Additionally, this article will follow the pneumonic memory device of M-O-S-S M-O-U-S-E. There are other ways to order the nine principles but in fact each principle is equal in value, and so a specific ordering of the principles is irrelevant. MOSS MOUSE will do.

Mass

Mass combat power at the decisive place and time. Coordinate, synchronize and harmonize combat power where it has a decisive effect on an enemy force in the shortest amount of time.

We mass all aspects of combat power – not merely the concentration of troops. The effects of crew served weapons, indirect fire, close air support, maneuver assets and even intangible considerations such as situational awareness can enable numerically smaller forces to win decisive victories!

Yet there are obvious dangers in massing. Our massed troops make an inviting target. Quick, violent acts limit the amount of time our troops are exposed to enemy fire while massed.

In simple tactical terms, mass combat power at one decisive point along the enemy’s formation. Do not attempt to attack all the enemy at once, everywhere! This exposes more of our troops to the enemy’s fire. Focus on breaching the enemy line and exploit that breach immediately.

Objective

Assign every subordinate unit and team a clearly defined and attainable objective. It matters little to the subordinate commander that his task is decisive, shaping or sustaining in the bigger picture of the mission. To that subordinate commander and unit, each task is decisive!

Without an assigned objective, teams are left without clear pictures of what they are suppose to achieve. In effect, they are useless, emasculated.

Keep in mind that the goal of warfare is to impose our will upon our enemy. Without a clearly defined objective, subordinate leaders and teams are left asking exactly how to achieve this.

Security

Never allow the enemy to gain an unexpected advantage. Yes, the enemy most certainly will have a set of advantages. This is inevitable. But we can mitigate known advantages, if nothing else than by avoiding them.

Situation awareness is a form of security. We must clearly identify and express the enemy’s most dangerous course of action (COA) and their most likely COA. This implies that we understand well the enemy’s capabilities, too.

Elusiveness is another form of security. We can achieve elusiveness through mobility speed or stealth. Either method makes it very difficult for the enemy to target our troops.

Security means force protection. And while any friendly COA involves an element of risk, security measures mitigate our vulnerability to hostile enemy counteractions.

Surprise

Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared. Surprise does not always mean to startle the enemy, though that is certainly acceptable.

Surprise can come in the manner of which we attack – that is the violence of action (VOA) and momentum achieved. If the enemy is ill prepared for this, VOA can decisively shift the balance of power on the battlefield.

Surprise can come in the time and place of our attack. If we attack from a time, direction or location for which the enemy is ill prepared, again we can achieve surprise. Deception such as a feign attack goes a long way in confusing the enemy as to the location of our decisive attack.

Surprise can come in the tempo of our operations. If we pulse our attacks continuously over a duration of time for which the enemy is ill prepared, we can achieve surprise. Unable to keep up with the resources required for a quick and continuous tempo, the enemy will yield.

Surprise is most commonly achieved through speed or stealth, followed by a particularly tenacious attack.

Maneuver

Gain and retain maneuver to place the enemy in a disadvantage. Maneuver is the flexible movement of forces within the battlespace.

Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balance and protects the force. Maneuver exploits success, preserves the initiative, and reduces our vulnerability to enemy targeting and fires. The effort is to continually pose new problems for the enemy by gaining a new direction of attack, eventually leading to the enemy’s defeat.

The lesson here is not to get bogged down, bunker down, and lose the momentum. If you do this you invite the enemy to outmaneuver your force, and they’ll seek the advantage of a better attacking position. Avoid this! Instead, gain and retain maneuver.

Offense

Gain, retain and exploit the initiative. Offensive action is the only way to impose our will upon our enemy. We defend only long enough to accumulate combat power and we then immediately go on the offensive again.

Offensive operations are the means by which we gain and maintain momentum. Momentum allows us freedom of maneuver and ultimately decisive victory.

The defense has its application, as spelled out above. However the mistake to avoid is the notion that we should sit still and wait to see what happens next. That only gives the initiative to our enemy, and soon we’ll be reactive instead of being proactive. That is the opposite of momentum.

Tactical leaders must gain, retain and exploit the initiative by seeking the offense.

Unity of Command

One commander for each operation – there can be only one!

Let us look at historic US examples of so-called “assumed exceptions” to this rule:

Operation Eagle Claw, Iran, April 1980 – multiple Special Operational Forces (SOF) meant multiple commands. Two aircraft crashed into each other at the beginning of this failed rescue mission; the result of two SOF commands not talking to each other. No unity of command.

Operation Gothic Serpent, Somalia, October 1993 – one conventional force and two SOF units meant three separate commands. The result was a poorly coordinated grab mission that resulted in the tactical defeat of two of America’s premier SOF units, as well as the strategic defeat of America’s objectives in Somalia. There was no unity of command.

Operation Anaconda, Afghanistan, March 2002 – one conventional command and two SOF units meant three separate commands, again not communicating effectively. The result effect was that more than 6,000 foreign terrorists successfully held up the US forces for weeks while they bought time and space for the bulk of their force to escape into Pakistan. Some believe Osama bin Laden was in the Shahi-Kot Valley during the beginning phase of this operation. No unity of command.

Seeing a pattern?

For every objective, seek unity of command and unity of effort. Unity of command means that all the forces fall under the authority of a single commander. This commander has the requisite authority to direct all forces in pursuit of a unified effort. Vary from this wisdom at your own peril.

Simplicity

“Keep It Simple, Stupid.” Otherwise known as The KISS Principle that states the more complex a plan is, the more certainly it will fail.

Leaders must prepare clear, uncomplicated plans. Leaders must issue concise orders to ensure understanding.

The objective of battle seems simple enough – beat the opponent’s brains out. But once you’re in the ring, the fight begins to look very complicated indeed! What was previously an impressive and complex plan before the fight begun, now looks hopelessly unachievable.

Simple plans and clear orders reduce confusion. Simplicity is not flashy or sexy, but it gets the job done time and time again.

Economy of Force

Focus the bulk of combat power at the decisive point of engagement. Safeguard this power greedily when allocating assets to shaping and sustaining missions.

Economy of force is the careful distribution of combat power. While no subordinate unit should ever be left without purpose, the allocation of available combat power to secondary tasks such as feign attacks, blocking delays, or even enveloping forces intended to fix the enemy in their escape routes must be measured in order to achieve mass at the decisive point and time.

Commanders and staffs need to ask themselves a simple question – “What is the most important part of this plan?” Then allocate as much combat power as possible to achieving that objective.

And there it is.

Some 200 years after Clausewitz penned the Principles of War, they are still relevant throughout the full spectrum of operations, and at every level of warfare – strategic, operational, and tactical.

This article was originally published on odjournal.com (Olive Drab: the journal of tactics) and has been transferred here with permission.

 

Mission Planning: In Seconds, Minutes and Hours

by Matt GedersLeadershipPosted on Comments are Disabled

Let’s begin by separating planning from decision-making. Though clearly related and even intertwined, it helps to think of these as two distinct processes.

Planning can be found in Troop Leading Procedure (TLP) and its parallel build, the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). Decision-making is also very much a part of these two processes, but this topic has been discussed in a previous ODJ article (see “Decision-Making” 1 November 2007).For this article then we will focus on the process of developing a mission plan at the small unit level – small unit defined for our sake as being those units without a battle staff, expressly the company, platoon, squad and fireteam.

Planning, like decision-making, can be thought of in terms of mere seconds, minutes and hours.

Mission Planning in Seconds…

When there are only seconds to plan, both planning and decision-making combine in the OODA loop – Observe, Orient, Decide, Act. This is the realm of Immediate Action (IA) battle drills. Battle drills are not planning, per se, but as discussed in the earlier article are instead a sort of micro tactics that are the building blocks to the larger tactical scheme of fire and maneuver.

Frankly, with just seconds to spare there is no time to develop any plan; thus the use of the word “immediate” in IA battle drills.

Through the OODA loop we see instantaneous planning and decision-making unique to battle drills. Again, the Recognition Primed Decision (RPD) process championed by Dr. Gary Klein and Associates comes into play. RPD combined with the question sequence of the Battle Drill Matrix (BDM) are powerful tools for accessing our own experiences to select a single, appropriate plan – one of our rehearsed drills. We see planning and decision-making intersect in just seconds.

Observe the initial act of instigation. Orient on this phenomenon to determine exactly what it is. Decide on a course of action (COA). Take action!

Once you have taken action, you will need to immediately observe your sector of engagement to see if your COA had the desired effect. And the system repeats itself until you’ve either achieved the desired outcome, or you’ve moved to safety. The repetitive nature of this model is why it’s called the OODA loop.

Mission Planning in Minutes…

The quickly changing dynamic of the battle space means that more often than not our small tactical units must plan on the fly, given just minutes to form a COA.

Planning, or COA development to use the military vernacular, employs the “one-third: two-thirds” rule. That is, only the first third of the time allotted prior to mission start is used for planning. The remaining two-thirds of the time must be allocated to the issuing of the Operation Order (OPORD), rehearsals, and Pre-Combat Checks and Inspections (PCC/PCI).

So, you’ve got one hour before your mission begins? Then you have only 20 minutes to plan! Such is the nature of small unit tactics. As we say, “Embrace the Suck.”

Now there is so much to mission planning that it is nearly impossible to cover in a dozen articles, much less one. However, when there are just minutes to plan, experience dictates that a generic approach works best.

Basic problem solving involves four simplified steps:

1. Identify the problem.
2. Generate possible solutions.
3. Compare the alternatives.
4. Make a choice.

Identify the problem. If you were standing on the dockyard at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the problem is pretty clear. You’re under attack from the air.

Generate possible solutions. Call it intuition or perspective, but you’ll begin to generate possible COA based on your experiences and training. If you are a naval gunners mate then you’re probably thinking of manning a weapon system to defend the skies. If you’re a fireman then you’re likely thinking of fighting the fires. In either case, with minutes to plan you start to think in terms of resources – what’s available, who can help, what priority needs work first, and how best to array those resources to respond to the situation.

Compare the alternatives. Frankly, this most commonly happens as you talk or think through the possible solutions, and rarely occurs as a separate third step. But that’s okay. It is actually happening, and you’re accessing your own experiences as well as assumptions of specific actions and the likely outcome. This is triage. What objective has the highest priority versus what can we actually achieve now, with our available resources?

Make a choice. You have to answer that last question. You have to set into motion your plan by communicating it to others.

There are two mistakes to avoid here. One is to fail to plan at all. If you have the time, use it! The other mistake is to use nearly all of your time planning, and then hope to convey your plan in just 2 minutes with no rehearsal and no inventory of functioning equipment and supplies.

Use the one-third: two-thirds rule. If you have an hour to respond, you have only 20 minutes to plan. If you have only 15 minutes to respond, you have only 5 minutes to plan. But by all means – make a plan!

Mission Planning in Hours…

Alright, you’ve been given a mission that will start in less than five hours. The one-third: two-thirds rule gives you an hour and thirty minutes to plan. What’s going to happen here is a truncated, abbreviated Step 2. Mission Analysis and Step 3. COA Development from the 8-step process of the MDMP.

In the mission analysis phase we first gather our input products first. These might include a higher-level Warning Order (WARNO), Operation Order (OPORD), or staff estimates from the brigade or battalion battle staff officers. With an eye on developing our own OPORD nested within the mission of higher command we begin to ask, “what do we know” and “what must we assume” about this mission?

We need to understand the problem, that is, our mission statement. Hopefully that comes from higher command! But in some rare cases, it must be assumed based on the given situation and our specified and implied responsibilities. (Think back to that fireman or gunners mate at Pearl Harbor.)

In most cases we will have an OPORD from higher command. If so, we look at the mission statement, commander’s intent and commander’s guidance for constraints and restraints regarding the Mission, Enemy, Time, Terrain, Troops available and Civilians on the battlefield (METT-TC). We assessed the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) for enemy capability and positions, plus the lay of the land – Observation, Cover and concealment, Obstacles, Key terrain, and Avenues of approach (OCOKA). And we determine the enemy’s most likely COA versus the enemy’s most dangerous COA.

Each of these considerations above become an output product of mission analysis for our own OPORD – IPB, Mission Statement, Commander’s Intent, Commander’s Guidance – keeping in mind that we are nesting all of our products within the mission, role and responsibility of the higher command, the larger unit to which we belong.

In the second phase, COA development, we also consider input and output products. We have just created the input products in the earlier analysis phase, and so we again refer to our newly developed IPB, Mission Statement, Commander’s Intent and Guidance, plus the enemy’s most likely COA and enemy’s most dangerous COA.

Now we need to develop the output for COA development. This involves a careful consideration of our combat power relative to the enemy’s combat power. Who has the longer-range weapons? Faster firing weapons? Mass casualty weapons? Greater number of troops? Better-trained troops? And who holds the superior terrain and/or staying power regarding logistics?

We then array our forces to mitigate the danger of the enemy’s combat power. Remember, we don’t need to outnumber the enemy everywhere – but instead only at the point in which we will engage the enemy decisively.

We develop a scheme of fire with a scheme of maneuver. Keep in mind that fire without maneuver is a waste of ammunition. Maneuver without fires is a waste of human lives.

Wrap it all together using a basic concept sketch as an overlay to your IPB. The IPB is most commonly expressed as a series of graphic symbols that include fire and maneuver control measures laid over a map.

You’ve just developed a COA, or mission plan. Theoretically you develop at least two distinctly different COA and wargame them separately to analyze and compare the assumed outcomes. However, with just an hour and a half, it is more realistic to say that you are simultaneously building one COA while eliminating multiple other COA under an assessment of which plan is more feasible versus which plan will more likely achieve success.

Hopefully you’ve worked with your more experienced subordinate leaders to develop this mission plan. There is no sense in developing a complex plan in a vacuum unless that is your only option!

In any case, you must now “fill in the blanks” for paragraph 1, 2, 4, and 5 of the OPORD. Your selected COA becomes Paragraph #3 Execution of that same OPORD.

In this way, you’ve adhered to the one-third: two-thirds rule to mission planning development. And you’ve created a COA that lends itself to a credible, useful OPORD for your team in just an hour or more, leaving ample time to issue the OPORD, conduct a rehearsal and Pre-Combat Inspection (PCI) prior to start of the mission.

That’s what I’d call gaining a leg up on success. As a final word of caution, I’ll insist that you don’t become so enamored with your own plan, so wedded to it on basis of pride that you cannot remain objective or flexible. Remember that reconnaissance is an on-going process that potentially will throw significant changes into your COA development and OPORD. The enemy also gets a vote, and Mother Nature gets a vote. That’s life. Embrace the suck.

This article was originally published on odjournal.com (Olive Drab: the journal of tactics) and has been transferred here with permission.

 

Operational Warfighters: An Intro to the Modern Battle Staff

by Matt GedersLeadershipPosted on Comments are Disabled

Contemporary battle staffs trace their lineage to Napoleon Bonaparte’s Grand Army. This staff concept is employed in a multitude of variations by every major military today.

Battle staff officers are warfighters at the operational-level of conflict. They work on behalf of the commanding officer and employ a myriad of technical expertise and knowledge.

There are three levels of battle staff, S, G and J staffs. S staffs work for a field grade officer, a major, lieutenant colonel, or colonel at the battalion, regiment, or brigade level. G staffs work for a general officer, brigadier general through general at the division, corps or army level. And J staffs work for a general or admiral at the joint task force level.

What follows is a fundamental overview of the most prominent battle staff positions at the S staff battalion and brigade level, their roles and responsibilities, and the tools they use or develop as a product of warfighting.

This is not a “how to” article on operational warfighting. For that there is a 10-month school, the US Army’s Command & General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, KS. Additionally a reference for operational warfighting already exists, the Battle Staff SMARTbook (The Lightning Press). Yes, another shameless plug for our sponsors – but let’s be honest here, if our reader is already serving on a battle staff, they’re already aware of the best-selling SMARTbook series. Trust me.

Commanding Officer

Commanders at the battalion and brigade level are called simply the “CO” for commanding officer. At the highest level of joint forces they are called the Combined Joint Forces Land Component Commander (CJFLCC, pronounced “see-jay-flick”).

Regardless of their title, commanders are responsible for the outcome of the mission. This is an enormous burden to bear, and they will directly interface with each primary staff officer and each subordinate leader at some point during the planning phase and execution phase of the mission.

To aid in both the planning phase and execution phase, commanders develop two critical outputs for the mission – Commander’s Intent and Commander’s Guidance. Every staff estimate and each staff product continues to shape the commander’s understanding of the mission and the environment in which it will take place. This is a maturation process of situational awareness.

Finally, commanders impart what is known as Commander’s Presence by getting to know each of his staff officers and subordinate leaders, and allowing them to get to know him as well.

Executive Officer

At higher levels of command such as division, theater joint task force, or Unified Combatant Commands (UCC), each responsibility under the commander is tasked to a separate officer – Deputy Commander (DC), Chief of Staff (CoS), and Executive Officer (XO). At battalion and brigade level, the XO is almost invariably also the DC, ready to pick up the battle in the event of the CO’s absence. Furthermore, the XO also plays the role of CoS with the purpose of controlling and coordinating the staff through the battle rhythm.

The battle rhythm is typically a spreadsheet product used to synchronize the battle staff through the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). In addition to the numerous XO and DC duties, the CoS duties include coordination and control of all Commander’s Update Briefings (CUB).

Sergeant Major

The Command Sergeant Major (CSM), addressed as simply “Sergeant Major”, is the senior-most enlisted Soldier or Marine in the battalion or brigade. It is said amongst enlisted troops that there are only two Soldiers who wear stars, generals and sergeant majors. Interestingly, like a general officer, the sergeant major does not wear the collar insignia of his or her career specialty. They are generalists at this level of expertise.

The CSM answers directly to the CO and is the advocate for all NCO and enlisted troops in the unit. The CSM, like all staff officers is responsible for a staff estimate, with the CSM focused on the training proficiency, safety, plus health and wellness of troops to conduct the mission. Necessarily then, the CSM commonly interfaces with the S1 and S3 (Training), as well as Chaplain services, medical staff and each company’s first sergeant.

S1 Personnel Officer

The S1 Personnel Officer’s area of expertise is troop strength management during the planning phase, and casualty replacement operations during the execution phase.

During the planning phase, the S1 employs and updates the Timed Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD, pronounced “tip-fid”) to keep track of force deployments for use in theater from various staging areas. The S1 interfaces continually with the S2, S3 and S4 staffs in regard to personnel management and casualty replacement during all phases.

S2 Intelligence Officer

The S2 area of expertise is in Military Intelligence and counterintelligence operations. The S2 helps the CO develop all aspects of the Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR), and this serves directly in the shaping of the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB).

During the MDMP, the S2 plays the role of the Opposing Force (OPFOR) for course of action (COA) wargaming and analysis. Through this process facts and assumptions of each COA are identified.

The S2 interfaces with all other staff personnel and works very closely with the CO and S3.

S3 Operations Officer

It is often said that all staff officers are equal, but the S3 is the “most equal”. The S3 Operations Officer is the hub of the battle staff.

In the simplest terms, the S3 is responsible for implementing MDMP during the planning phase in order to develop the Operations Plan (OPLAN) until it becomes the Operations Order (OPORD). The S3 commonly plays the role of the battalion or brigade forces (BLUFOR) during COA wargaming. And during the execution phase, the S3 communicates Fragmentary Orders (FRAGO) to subordinate commanders. Though again, this is an oversimplified description of the S3 roles and responsibilities – which may include a separate S3 Training staff to ensure the force can achieve the mission.

If the S3 is the hub, every other part of the battle staff is a spoke stemming off from that hub. It is also said within battle staffs, “I don’t care if the CO did approve it. If you didn’t tell the S3, it ain’t gonna happen!”

It is imperative then that in addition to working with all other staff officers, the S3 works closely with the CO and XO (CoS).

S4 Logistics Officer

Perhaps the most underrated warfighter on the battle staff is the S4 Logistics Officer. After all, counting beans, bullets, batteries and band-aids is a thankless and inglorious job. Yet it is here in logistics that entire battles and indeed wars are won or lost.

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto was a leader who wisely mastered this nuanced influence of battle. It is said that he warned the Japanese War Council prior to the Second World War that he could deliver victory for Japan for one year before the American logistical might would turn the tide and crush the Empire of Japan. His warnings were not heeded, and yet it came to past.

During the planning phase the S4 develops the Logistics Estimate for the battalion or brigade. Additionally, the S4 develops the Combat Service Support (CSS) Execution Matrix to coordinate CSS operations for each COA generated. It is critical then that the S4 is present during the MDMP COA wargaming process because the S2 must identify facts and assumptions through the S4 input. These facts and assumptions are absolutely vital to CCIR.

The S4 Logistics Officer coordinates all CSS sustainment operations during the execution phase. This includes not only fuel, munitions and ration re-supply, but also casualty evacuation, vehicle recovery and maintenance operations, and troop transportation – as well as identifying main supply routes (MSR) and lines of communication (LOC) for each effort.

S5 Civil Affairs Officer

The S5 Civil Affairs (CA) Officer uses Mission Evaluation Criteria (MEC) to coordinate with, enhance, develop, establish, or control civil infrastructures in operational areas to support friendly operations. The UN and NATO refer to this as Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC).

To achieve this mission, the S5 interfaces with host national (HN) government as well as US and coalition Non-Government Organizations (NGO) and Other Government Agencies (OGA) outside the Department of Defense (DoD).

Additionally, the S5 role may also include Psychological Operations (PSYOP) missions to disrupt enemy activity or to win the support of the HN civilian population.

The S5 works closely with the S2 and S4 staffs to achieve CA and PSYOP missions.

S6 Communications Officer

The S6 is responsible for the entire communication network for the battalion or brigade. The communication staff uses the System Planning Worksheet to develop networks that links the Tactical Operation Center (TOC) to subordinate and supporting units. The S6 Communications Officer enforces communication security (COMSEC) and proper use of the Signal Operating Instructions (SOI – Army, CEOI – Marine Corps).

The S6 interfaces with every single staff section, all subordinate commands and units, as well as supporting units. Additionally, the S6 may be required to coordinate with coalition, HN, and NGO/OGA parties.

Targeting/FX Cell Leader

The targeting effects (FX) cell is typically formed through a break-out working group. As such the cell leader can be assigned by virtue of the nature of the mission, either kinetic or non-kinetic (violent or non-violent effects). During kinetic operations it is not uncommon for a liaison officer from a supporting artillery or armor unit, or feasibly even the Forward Air Controller/Combat Controller (FAC – Army, CC – Air Force) to act as the targeting cell leader.

Yet during non-kinetic operations such as humanitarian disaster relief missions, the targeting cell leader may be pulled from the S5 CA or PSYOP, and would certainly include representatives from the S2 and S4 shop.

Whatever the mission, the targeting cell uses a Targeting Synchronization Matrix for various effects and Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS). The targeting cell uses an established method of Decide, Detect, Deliver, and Assess (D3A) when determining which effect is needed, what to target, how to best achieve the effect, and how to assess the impact of the battalion or brigade efforts.

That is the modern battle staff in a nutshell. Is this an overly simplified description? Certainly. Furthermore, no two battle staffs are organized exactly the same way. The unit mission and Table Organizational Equipment (TOE) or Table Data Allowances (TDA) shape the battle staff organization.

Yet what is critical is that we’re able to appreciate tactical warfighting in the framework of operational warfighting, and bridge between the two. For mission planning purposes it is important that we, as tacticians, understand how the battle staff supports our mission as well as how we link to the rest of the battalion and brigade.

This article was originally published on odjournal.com (Olive Drab: the journal of tactics) and has been transferred here with permission.

 

Know Your Gear: AR15 – The Dubious Underdog

by Matt GedersGear/EquipmentPosted on Comments are Disabled

Let me tell you a story you already know. Some 500 years ago the Europeans re-discovered the North American continent and colonized it. English, French, Spanish, German, Dutch and even Russian people populated colonies, all mixed within the “Thousand Nations” of native peoples here in what is today the United States. But of course, we only became a nation in 1776, just a scant 235 years ago.

What we tend to forget is that America was not a superpower with overnight success. Depending on which historian you ask and how we define the term “superpower”, America evolved into this status somewhere between the end of the First World War in 1919 or at the end of the Second World War in 1945.

So America has been a superpower for 92 years or 66 years depending on who’s counting. What this means is that for less than a century the US Armed Forces have been projected to the farthest corners of the earth, fighting in every conceivable terrain and weather condition.

Incredibly, for the past 46 years of that short reign as a superpower, the American warfighter has reached for the AR15 to conduct the dangerous and deadly business of waging battle.

In other words, it is not the beloved Springfield M1903 that holds this record, though it served for an impressive 32 years as a main battle rifle. It is not the venerable M1 Garand that holds this record, having served 20 years as the main battle rifle. Nor is it the magnificently accurate M14 that served a mere 8 years as our main battle rifle. Though to be certain, each of these designs is brilliant in their own rite.

No. The longest serving main battle rifle is the “mouse gun”, the “Mattel toy”, the weapon that everyone loves to hate, the AR15. It has now surpassed even the service record of the Brown Bess musket in the US military.

How did it come to this? The improbable success of the AR15 in its many variant generations – M16, A1, A2, A3, A4 rifles and the equally numerous carbine generations from the XM177E to the current M4A1 serving across the globe – likely stems from the AR15’s incredibly flexible platform.

It might be argued that the AR15 consistently wins “second best”. It cannot outshoot long range .30 caliber battle rifles. It lacks the penetration and energy-to-target ratio of that weapon class. It is not as agile as the bullpup series of rifles and carbines. Nor is it a particularly cheap weapon to manufacture. And it certainly doesn’t have the reputation of reliability such as the Kalashnikov! Don’t kid yourself, perception is a critical factor in gaining the confidence of warriors.

What it does do successfully is rank as a suitable alternative for each of these considerations – accuracy, lethality, agility, reliability, and cost. And that status earns the AR15 a reputation as a remarkably adaptable weapon to various battle environments, from the beaches to the jungle, from the cities to the mountains, from the arctic to the desert plains.

This consideration, coupled with the modularity of the AR15 platform and its ability to switch the same weapon from a rifle, to light machinegun, to sub-machinegun, and back to a carbine gives the US Armed Forces exactly what it needs. Flexibility.

The AR15 has not been a beloved weapon. Exactly the opposite! It was despised in the months and years after it was introduced. America was embroiled in the jungle warfare of Vietnam. The hard-hitting and accurate M14 quickly became of victim of its own success – unnecessarily accurate in the confined close quarter fight of the jungle.

The AR15 was introduced to the US Army in 1965 as the M16 rifle, and was erroneously touted as a “self cleaning” wonderment of modern weapon technology. Nothing could be further from the truth. The unbelievably tight working spaces, necessary for a piston-free direct impingent gas system, required disciplined maintenance by the troops. Add to that frustration the fact that the US Army Ordinance had allowed a more corrosive powder to be used in the early ammunition than was called for by the AR15 weapon specifications, and disaster soon followed.

It seemed that the AR15 had failed. But dutifully, US Army Ordinance began insisting on the cleaner powder in the ammunition, and took the design back to the drawing board. Changes were made, most notably the protruding forward assist press lever and raised box rim around the magazine release button. These were small changes, but very significant.

The M16A1 saw proliferated service among all four branches of the US military by 1967. It was a much better design, but it was still hated. It seemed the AR15 could not shake the stigma from its earlier failures. And to this very day, the Canadian Army speciously insists that the forward assist must be tapped each and every time a round is chambered in their AR15 variant, the C7.

The fact that the AR15 was adopted by so many allied militaries is something of a miracle in and of itself. Our NATO allies viewed the 5.56mm round as a underpowered runt, undeserving of a main battle rifle. Yet admittedly several Asian militaries were quick to embrace the weapon due to its manageable size, light weight and very low felt recoil.

By the 1970s high speed cameras and the use of gelatin molds were used for a more scientific approach to in-flight ballistics and terminal ballistics. A remarkable thing was discovered.

It turns out that the 5.56mm round had not only a much flatter in-flight trajectory than most other battle rifle cartridges of the day (already known), but the terminal ballistics of the 5.56mm round were terribly lethal and downright nasty! What this meant was that the AR15 could be aimed at the target with little regard for bullet drop all the way out to 300 meters. And when the bullet struck even the soft tissue of its intended target, the bullet would very quickly yaw (turn sideways) and fragment from its full-metal jacket. Even the lead core would often fly apart. And it maintained this deadly yaw and fragmentation effect out to just over 200 meters.

Suddenly, the AR15 didn’t look quite so puny.

After almost two decades of service, it became clear to NATO armies that America wasn’t going to dismiss the AR15 anytime soon. France chambered its new FAMAS bullpup in the American 5.56mm cartridge and the rest of the NATO partners took note. Soon the Belgians began work on the small bullet to see if they could somehow beef it up for their FNH Minimi (US M249) light machinegun. They did just that. And the US Marines fell in love with the new round.

In 1982 the newest generation of AR15, the M16A2, was introduced to the US military. This rifle sported a heavier barrel with significantly tighter rifling to stabilize the newly developed Belgian SS109 round (US M855) at 62 grain weight, up from the US Army’s M193 bullet at 55 grains. The M16A2 also included a better rear sight with a mechanical bullet drop compensator for quick adjustment for firing ranges beyond 300 meters.

Anecdotally, US infantrymen took the new M16A2 to known distance (KD) ranges and quite literally were giggling like school girls! The advancements to the AR15 were enough to make a good rifle into an excellent rifle. It was now possible to aim directly at the target at 500 meters with little regard for bullet drop and hit time after time, even in rapid fire conditions.

In a period of less than ten years, National Rifle Association (NRA) 600-yard competitions saw the AR15 platform increase from just 10 percent of rifles used at these events, to 95 percent use. With just a bit of tweaking, this rifle could regularly manage sub-minute of angle (MOA) shot groupings. By the early 1990s, the AR15 had finally come into its own.

It has since served another 20 years as the main battle rifle of US forces. We’ve seen the 3rd and 4th generations of the AR15, making it all the more modular and specialized to just about every warrior mission and task. In the mid-1990s the stunted carbine, a favorite among US Special Operational Forces, was accepted as the issued weapon. With all of the recent upgrades, this carbine was dubbed the M4.

Virtually every allied military uses a variation of the AR15 weapon, and/or has developed their own rifle and carbine in the same 5.56mm cartridge – France, South Korea, Germany, England, Canada, Australia, Belgium, Italy, Swiss, Austria, the list goes on and even includes Russia.

There are now numerous contenders to the AR15, many claiming to be superior for one reason or another. But those claims have yet to pan out. Even inside the US there have been new weapon platforms introduced that were supposedly going to outperform the AR15.

The promising XM8 project, a joint US and German effort looked to improve on the two perceived weaknesses of the AR15, the direct impingent gas system and the underpowered bullet. Soon after the XM8’s rejection by the Pentagon, Bushmaster released another attempt to overcome these two weaknesses with the short-piston Adaptive Combat Rifle (ACR). While both the XM8 and ACR look impressive on paper and in initial field performances, the US military is understandably reluctant to give up a known success, the AR15.

Is the AR15 perfect? Of course not! Such a claim would be ridiculous. And certainly something in the near future will replace the AR15 and our love-hate relationship with this improbable but successful weapon system.

Still, love it or hate it, the AR15 weapon platform has been the go-to solution for the US military and numerous allied militaries around the world for an incredible 46 years of service. Whatever replaces the AR15, it has big expectations to fill. It turns out it is not so easy to be “second best” at everything. Who knew?

This article was originally published on odjournal.com (Olive Drab: the journal of tactics) and has been transferred here with permission.

 

Commander’s Critical Information: What the leader needs to know, and needs to hide

by Matt GedersLeadershipPosted on Comments are Disabled

Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) are defined by the Department of Defense as a comprehensive list of information requirements identified by the commander as being critical in facilitating timely information management and the decision making process that affect successful mission accomplishment.

Huh. Well that’s a workable definition, though it creates a breech of protocol by including in the definition the same words as the term being defined. My high school English teacher would say this definition is a bit vague. I certainly had to read it a few times before it started to sink in.

How about this instead – CCIR is intelligence data needed to make well-informed decisions.

I tend to think the first “c” (commander) implies the “whom” of the term and definition. But frankly there is a bit of a danger here in overemphasizing the commander in the definition. Yes, it is certainly true that the commander dictates the CCIR with the help of experienced subordinates. It is further true that the commander is an end user of CCIR, and is ultimately responsible for the outcome of the mission. However, it would be a mistake to think that CCIR is solely used and gathered by the commander!

Every Soldier a sensor. This expression illustrates exactly who is responsible for gathering and passing along CCIR. Everyone.

Okay, we’ve defined CCIR as the intelligence data the commander needs to make decisions. But what exactly is that intelligence data? And where does it come from? How do we collect it and report it?

Doctrinally speaking there are two subsets of CCIR that concern the collection of intelligence data – Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR), and Friendly Force Intelligence Requirements (FFIR). Yet from a practical perspective there is a third concern, the Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI).

PIR may be simply defined as “what the commander needs to know about the enemy.”

FFIR could then be defined as “what the commander needs to know about his own forces.”

EEFI includes “information the commander wants to hide from the enemy.”

So if you’ll pardon the alphabet soup of military acronyms, CCIR includes PIR and FFIR in terms of intelligence data collecting; plus EEFI in terms of information security. Such definitions may be overly simplistic, however at the tactical level of warfare these definitions are both accurate and pragmatic.

Priority Intelligence Requirements

PIR is information the commander needs to know about the enemy. Of course this entails the disposition of the enemy force, but also subtleties that may not be so obvious at first.

PIR may also include the disposition of the civilian populous relative to enemy efforts, as well as weather and terrain conditions that impact enemy operations and logistics. Have winter snows closed down the high altitude pass from which the enemy is relying for supplies? Has the civilian population and/or key leaders turned against the enemy force due to recent enemy activities? If so, this PIR is indeed critical to the commander’s next decision, assuming of course the commander wishes to exploit the enemy’s disadvantage.

More commonly, PIR entails:

– The enemy’s location and position.
– The enemy’s activities or significant actions (SIGACT).
– The enemy’s relative combat power – troop strength and morale, weapon capability, logistical constraints, and communication restraints.
Every bit as important as where the enemy is located – is where the enemy is not. Where the enemy is not also opens doors of possibilities.

It’s worth mentioning that where the civilian population is absent requires some explanation, too. Especially when civilians are absent from locations where they normally populate and reside.

Who collects PIR? Again, everyone. But PIR is further assigned to Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets. This includes virtually every imaginable type of patrol, mounted or dismounted, as well as more sophisticated collection methods used by Signal Corps electronic warfare and Military Intelligence via manned and unmanned aerial vehicle (M/UAV) platforms. Finally, networks of spies and informants are also used to collect human intelligence (HUMINT).

What is critical about PIR, like all aspects of CCIR, is that it must be identified and assigned! PIR that is too general in nature will be easily and routinely overlooked. PIR needs to be specific enough to focus intelligence collection efforts on the objective. It should also be assigned to specific units for collection. PIR must not be left to the “honey do” list of various units, unchecked. After all, the only tasks that get completed are those tasks that are checked.

Friendly Force Intelligence Requirements

FFIR is information the commander needs to know about his own forces. Yes, this includes the disposition of friendly forces during operations. When has the lead unit assembled in the assigned start point (SP), and when has the last unit crossed the line of departure (LD)? These are exactly the sorts of questions the commander needs to know about the status of his forces. But FFIR is so much bigger in scope than merely fire and maneuver coordination.

A plan is based on a series of facts and assumptions. If the facts change or the assumptions are no longer valid, the commander must then adjust the plan!

Who informs the commander of these changes in facts and assumptions about our friendly forces? Aren’t FFIR assigned to some staff officer in the Tactical Operation Center (TOC)? The answer isn’t as simple yes or no.

Yes, certainly a staff officer is assigned to report specific changes in FFIR. But a TOC can only report what it knows – that is, what has been reported to the TOC by subordinate units. This requires timely and accurate reports from the subordinate units.

It also requires specific FFIR delineated by the commander to subordinate leaders:
– Report at 10, 20 and 30 percent troop casualties for the unit in whole.
– Report at 50 percent troop casualties for any single subordinate unit.
– Report at 10, 20 and 30 percent consumption of ammunition or fuel for the unit in whole.
– Report at 50 percent consumption of ammunition or fuel for any single subordinate unit.
– Report at 50 percent loss of crew served weapons for any single subordinate unit.
– Report at 25 percent loss of land-borne vehicles for any single subordinate unit.
– Report any loss of air-borne vehicles.
– Report any loss of medical evacuation assets.
– Report any loss of ISR assets.
Note that some FFIR look at the unit as a whole, while other FFIR consider the conditions of each subordinate unit. A battalion commander would consider the relative operational power of each rifle company; a company commander would consider the same of each platoon; and a platoon would consider each squad’s combat power.

It’s not that any single condition set above would absolutely result in the culmination of the mission. However, each of these FFIR may very well mean the commander would need to adjust accordingly to the new facts and assumptions.

If the lead element in an attack has hit 50 percent losses in personnel, the commander may opt to rotate that unit to the rear of the formation and let another unit take the lead. Furthermore heavy losses due to casualties may mean a further strain on medical evacuation assets, which in turn might potentially clog the lines of communication (LOC) – the route or axis of the advance.

Likewise, if the friendly reserve force has consumed 30 percent of its fuel, it can likely still achieve its assigned mission. When that consumption hits the 50 percent mark, the commander may want to allocate fuel supplies to the reserve force.

Yet without FFIR being fed back to the commander, these decisions and adjustments go unmade. This can be fatal to our mission.

How do we identify those specific FFIR? Many FFIR become apparent through our assumptions of friendly force capabilities through the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). More specifically this occurs during MDMP Step 4. COA Analysis, more commonly called wargaming the multiple courses of action (COA). During the wargaming process we must state facts and assumptions about friendly force capabilities, and make decisions based on these facts and assumptions. These facts and assumptions can then be identified as FFIR.

Once the FFIR is identified, this information is communicated to subordinate unit leaders. A system of checks and a system of reporting is also implemented. Finally, contingency plans must be identified in case these facts later change or assumptions prove invalid.

FFIR has been far less practiced as a system than PIR. It’s not that the troops don’t see the problems as they become apparent, but more commonly there is no identified means of communicating the problem when it becomes apparent. And even when FFIR is reported in a timely and accurate manner, if there is no contingency plan, it makes it all the more difficult for the commander to adjust to the new facts and assumptions.

Commanders need to be abreast of FFIR, and those staff officers and subordinate leaders taking part in the wargaming of different COA during the MDMP must step up with specific information regarding FFIR. After all, every plan is based on facts and assumptions. The limits of these facts and assumptions become FFIR for the commander!

Essential Elements of Friendly Information

EEFI is information the commander wants to hide from the enemy. Much of this, too, is fairly intuitive – the battle plan, signal operating instructions (SOI), troop strength and movements are all operational security (OPSEC) concerns and need to be kept secret, hidden away from enemy spies and ISR assets. Yet like PIR, EEFI also includes subtleties that aren’t immediately obvious.

For example the enemy typically knows the location of friendly troops. The enemy is at least aware of the general position of our forward line of troops (FLOT). If we are conducting patrolling operations from a Forward Operating Base (FOB) the enemy is almost certainly aware of the exact location and dimensions of our FOB. But the enemy wouldn’t know where inside the FOB the command, control and communications (C3) nodes were located.

Zebras, after all are well suited to hiding amongst the herd of zebras. In a similar manner, C3 nodes, troops billets and logistical depot locations are unknown to the enemy even when the enemy has a pretty good idea where our forces are. And clearly, these concerns fall under EEFI.

If the enemy knew the locations of these priority nodes and placed them under direct or indirect fires during a critical phase of the mission, the disruption to C3 or logistical sustainment could be catastrophic. So we need to establish the EEFI and protect them under Operational Security (OPSEC) methods.

Who identifies EEFI? Not surprisingly, EEFI are also derived from the MDMP wargaming process. Each COA will have a set of EEFI, information that we need to hide from the enemy in order for the mission to be successful. While anyone can identify EEFI, typically the S2 Intelligence Officer is responsible for identifying through the COA wargaming process and recommending EEFI to the commander.

Again, there are subtleties that need to be grasped. For example, during the COA wargaming phase an experienced warrior may understand the importance of protecting the rules of engagement (ROE) under EEFI. If the enemy understands the limits of the ROE, they can and will leverage that information against our friendly forces. During Operation Gothic Serpent, enemy knowledge of the US Army ROE is precisely how Somali clansmen were able to get so close to US forces and wreak havoc in the Battle of Mogadishu.

The US Army defines EEFI as critical aspects of a friendly operation that if known by the enemy, would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation.

Again, EEFI evolve from facts, assumptions and key tasks of the mission. EEFI are discovered through the MDMP and everyone helps in identifying EEFI. However it is important to remember that EEFI isn’t doctrinally part of CCIR, and it doesn’t become a priority until the commander establishes the EEFI. Commanders – you must establish EEFI.

CCIR is necessary for the commander to make well-informed decisions, and as such CCIR has a critical impact on virtually every aspect of the mission. PIR is the means by which the commander tasks his ISR assets. FFIR is the means by which the commander understands the status of each subordinate unit during the mission. And EEFI involves critical information the commander needs to hide from the enemy, for the success of the mission.

Each aspect must be identified, assigned, and a system of reporting must be implemented for CCIR to function. Without CCIR we cannot meaningfully adjust the plan once we’ve begun.

This article was originally published on odjournal.com (Olive Drab: the journal of tactics) and has been transferred here with permission.

 

The 70 Percent Solution: Perspectives of Time Management

by Matt GedersLeadershipPosted on Comments are Disabled

Be willing to make decisions. That’s the most important quality in a good leader. Don’t fall victim to what I call the ready-aim-aim-aim-aim syndrome. You must be willing to fire. — T. Boone Pickens

I am quick to point out that while leadership and management are inextricably entwined, leadership is a universal art whereas management is industry specific. Alright then, it’s time I put some weight behind that statement. Let’s talk time management from multiple industry perspectives – corporate, academic, and martial.

Corporate Time Management

Whether its time to plan, decide, or produce, the corporate world looks at the bottom line, profit. Thank God they do. We wouldn’t want it any other way. And because of this, business innovates quickly in order to remain competitive with other businesses.

To explore this point further, we have to ask ourselves, “How late is acceptable?” For a business meeting, or for a product deadline the answer to that question is pretty much the same. How much can the profit margin tolerate?

Don’t misunderstand my point here. Speed is identified as one of the three great values in business. As they say, you can have it cheap, good or fast. So speed is a concrete value, but only so much as the profit line is involved.

There is some room to fudge here then. If we cannot have it fast, but we manage to produce our product or perform our service cheap and good, then the profit margin will do well. So in terms of speed, the corporate world balances this requirement with other considerations. Yet ultimately the bottom line is profit.

Academic Time Management

In contrast to the corporate perspective on time, the academic world see little value to speedy process or decision. Instead, academia places value on being correct.

The academic process might be simplified in terms of hypothesis, experiment and assessment. We only accept a hypothesis as “fact” once it has gone through this academic process exhaustively and multiple scholars come to the same conclusion. And nowhere in this process is speed discussed as a value.

Understandably, academia innovates very slowly – the same as other institutions of government and religion. Being correct is valuable. And if it takes considerable time to find the correct solution or conclusion, so be it.

How late is acceptable in academia? It’s hard to say. Anecdotally the professor sometimes fails to show up for class. But that’s okay, we’ll catch up on the lesson later in the week. And our thesis might take an extra semester, but what’s one more semester after four years of work?

The bottom line here is that our work better be correct. This requires the 100 percent solution.

Military Time Management

How late is acceptable in the military? I can answer that question succinctly with another question. “What’s ‘late’?”

There is no such thing as “late” in the military. The military will not detain or delay a flight, a ship, or a convoy for late military personnel. Those Soldiers, Marines, Sailors or Airmen simply missed movement, to use the military vernacular. That offense is punishable by law.

Military subordinates are not late for the commander’s meeting. They simply missed the meeting. There is an armed NCO assigned to lock the door once the meeting begins. No one is allowed to enter the commander’s meeting after it has begun. And trying to force the tent flap open to get inside is a good way to get your arm broken by one seriously angry NCO!

Let me put this another way. It is said throughout the military, “If you are not 10 minutes early, you ARE late.”

Martial discipline is not concerned with being 100 percent correct. Neither is it concerned with profit. Instead, the military is concerned with understanding first, deciding first, and acting first.

Unlike other government institutions, the military must innovate quickly within the battlespace – albeit not so quickly within the military institution itself. That means the educational institution of the military slowly evolves, but rarely experiences revolutionary change. However, on the field of battle it is quite another matter.

A 70 percent solution today is far more valuable than the 100 percent solution tomorrow. Tomorrow is too late. The battle will be lost or won by then.

Furthermore and perhaps more pertinently still, a 100 percent solution is useless and potentially dangerous. Humans invest their pride in a 100 percent solution. They become married to that idea until it succeeds or fails. That can be fatal on the battlefield.

By contrast, a 70 percent solution presumes changes and additions to the plan will be required. After all, the enemy gets a vote, too. So does Mother Nature.

The enemy has no interest in seeing our beautiful plan become successful, regardless of whether our plan has been established at 70 percent or 100 percent. The enemy is intent on upsetting our best laid plans!

Our plan cannot control the weather or terrain or daylight. The universe expands and changes in predictable randomness.

Given that the enemy and Mother Nature both get a say in our plan, there is zero benefit for us to ever finalize the plan. Once a leader estimates his or her plan to about the 70 percent mark, it is time to put the plan into action.

“Understand First” means to gain situational awareness. “Decide First” means to establish a plan at about the 70 percent solution. “Act First” means to seek the initiative and disrupt the enemy’s actions and decision-making.

In the martial industry, he who gets to the 70 percent solution first – acts first. And more often than not, that translates into battlefield victory.

This article was originally published on odjournal.com (Olive Drab: the journal of tactics) and has been transferred here with permission.