Category: Leadership

There is no single, magical solution in leadership style. The cliché of “one size” does not and will not fit all situations. For this reason it is best if we are aware of the various leadership styles; the situations in which each is best suited; and the limitations of each style.

How do we choose our own particular style? Some experts insist that we don’t! One popular contention is that we default to specific leadership styles given the particulars of each situation and our own personality traits. Yet other experts insist that we can make cognitive decisions as to which leadership style to chose for any given situation.

So is it personality driven, or cognitively selected? Probably a little of both, but the most accurate answer may not be so relevant. The point is that we need to be aware of which styles work for us under a given situation.

Still, there are a few absolutes about leadership, such as the axiom that leaders are ultimately responsible for mission completion. Leaders can delegate authority; yet they can never delegate responsibility.

This statement isn’t intended to detract from the function of the Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) who’s primary purpose is the care of troops. While it is certainly the case that the NCO is also in a leadership position, more commonly the mission is lead by an officer with an NCO as the second-in-command. In this manner the officer is ultimately responsible for mission completion, and the NCO is ultimately responsible for care of the troops. It is an unresolved paradox – and intentionally so.

That issue aside for the moment, let’s take an overview look at the four leadership styles: authoritarian, participative, delegative, and transformational.

Authoritarian Style

Also called the autocratic leader. Authoritarian leadership is often misunderstood by the academic community. It is commonly misdiagnosed as a “selfish” form of leadership in which subordinates are yelled at and belittled. However this is not a good example of authoritarian leadership. Indeed, it is not a good example of any form of leadership. Such behavior is abusive, unethical, and probably illegal.

Authoritarian leadership style is commonly used when the leader has the necessary information and time is critical. Autocratic leaders are often excellent in crisis management because decisions are made and communicated in a timely manner. Furthermore, autocratic leaders are particularly effective when subordinates are inexperienced but motivated.

Still, the authoritarian leadership style has its limits. This approach to leadership stifles teamwork and creative solutions because team members cannot see the decision-making process and “buy in” is limited. Also, because the autocratic leader makes all the decisions, this forces talented professionals to seek promotion, experience, and recognition elsewhere, while it retains inexperienced team members and mediocrity.

A discussion on the authoritarian leadership style would not be complete without a cautionary note on a variant of this style called “rule by exception.” In this wicked form, the autocratic leader takes on the pretense of mentoring subordinates by withdrawing from the decision-making, and then punishing the subordinate for not leading in exactly the same manner and/or making the exact same decision that the autocratic leader would have. Conversely, the autocratic leader might reward the subordinate for coming to exactly the same conclusion and/or mimicking the behavior of the autocratic leader, thereby setting a standard of absolute power for the leader.

To rule by exception delegates absolutely no authority in subordinates to make a decision. It merely gives the pretense of doing so. This perversion of leadership strikes fear and paralysis into the team members. (And often it is intended to do exactly that!)

Simply put – if you’re going to delegate authority, you no longer get to make the decision of how the task is completed. Back off. Let the subordinate leader make decisions as they see best.

Participative Style

The participative form of leadership is excellent for building esprit de corps within the team. It is also suitable for mentoring subordinate leaders into higher levels of leadership position and experience.

The participative leader understands that he or she does not have all the answers to each situation that may arise. As such they seek the council and expertise of their team members for multiple possible solutions, and select the best solution, often through consensus. This leadership style has the additional benefit of expressing value for subordinate team members’ talents and opinions. Most industries recommend participative leadership as the default style.

However, when time is critical, working toward consensus may mean failure. Under the stress of emergency situations, participative leaders can appear weak and uncertain of themselves. Be careful here. There is a time and place to be authoritarian in approach to leadership.

Delegative Style

Also called laissez faire leadership. Delegative leadership is excellent for division of authority to more readily manage large tasks, though ultimately the delegative leader is responsible for the decision.

Delegation of the decision-making demonstrates an absolute trust in the subordinate leader(s) to make reasonable and effective choices. Note that the term “right choice” was not used because that would suggest only one outcome was acceptable. Instead, delegative leaders openly embrace the notion that there exist multiple solutions for any given problem. As such, the delegative style of leadership is very effective when subordinates are experienced and bring unique expertise to the team.

However, when over used, the delegative style of leadership creates high levels of anxiety in subordinates. Subordinates often cannot see the immediate impact of their decisions and this lack of feedback creates unacceptable levels of stress. The delegative leader may eventually be viewed as lazy, incompetent or uncaring by subordinates. Be cautious in application.

Transformational Style

Transformational leadership is about implementing innovative ideas to change self, others or the organization. Unlike transactional leadership styles (authoritarian, participative, delegative) that work within the status quo to achieve success, transformational leadership brings innovative change.

Yet in order to innovate, transformational leaders also destroy or abandon the status quo. This can be dangerous and even catastrophic. Some of history’s most famous and infamous leaders were transformational in their approach. Jesus Christ transformed the Judean religion. Mahatma Gandhi transformed the ruling influence of the Indian subcontinent. And Adolf Hitler transformed the impoverished German state into a global superpower.

When done well, a transformational leader is inexplicably brilliant. Inexplicable, and yet such transformational leaders appear to have at least three consistent qualities: charisma, vision and influence. All of these qualities are elusive and nearly impossible to teach. But they can be learned through experience.

Charisma – This is hard to define, but like art, you know it when you see it. Transformational leaders might be described as constantly seeking to move beyond their own limitations, and inspiring others to do the same.

Vision – Transformational leaders visualize, describe and direct. They describe a compelling vision of the future that motivates others to action. They describe the conditions necessary for success.

Influence – If effective management relies on authority, then effective leadership relies on influence. Transformational leaders offer new ways to look at old problems, encouraging new solutions. They are adept at aligning the goals of their followers with the leader’s vision.

Again, the question at hand is not “which leader are you?” Instead it is “which leadership style will you assume, and in which situation?”

There is no single most effect style. However, this assertion does not relieve us as leaders of our responsibility to complete the mission. The success of the mission often depends on the character, the quality, and the approach of the leader. This is what we mean when we say the leader must impart Commander’s Presence amongst their subordinates.

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This article was originally published on odjournal.com (Olive Drab: the journal of tactics) and has been transferred here with permission.

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The brilliance of Carl von Clausewitz’s essay Principles of War (1812) is that his words are as relevant today as they were 200 years ago. This work places Clausewitz, along with Sun Tzu, as one of the most quoted military philosophers of all time.

Yet Clausewitz was not the only military philosopher of his day. We’d be remiss if we failed to mention a contemporary of Clausewitz, the military philosopher Antoine-Henri Jomini. Clausewitz and Jomini make for an interesting comparison and contrast.

Jomini, a Swiss officer, fought under Napoleon Bonaparte. From the French and Swiss military traditions we might guess that Jomini would be more descriptive in his approach to military philosophy. Not at all. Instead, the able Jomini takes a very prescriptive approach, giving specific guidance to the array of combat power, the formation of troops, and how, when and where artillery is to be employed.

As such, Jomini’s observations were extremely relevant to the tactics and technology of his day. Indeed, one could argue that if we were to attempt to extract the underlying principles of Jomini’s prescriptive guidance, his philosophy would still be relevant. Perhaps.

Clausewitz, by comparison, was a Prussian soldier who eventually obtained a commission as an officer (championed by junior ranking warriors for having started his career as an enlisted troop). Clausewitz fought under the Russian banner against Napoleon’s Grand Army.

Again, from the Germanic military traditions we might expect Clausewitz to be equally prescriptive as Jomini in his approach to military philosophy. Not at all. Instead, we see quite the opposite. Clausewitz is descriptive rather than prescriptive in his approach, offering guidance as to the conditions that lend themselves to battlefield victory.

What follows then are the 9 Principles of War as interpreted by the US Army. Expressly because Clausewitz was descriptive in his approach, other militaries vary somewhat in their interpretations of the Principles of War. Yet for our sake we’ll stick with the American interpretation.

Additionally, this article will follow the pneumonic memory device of M-O-S-S M-O-U-S-E. There are other ways to order the nine principles but in fact each principle is equal in value, and so a specific ordering of the principles is irrelevant. MOSS MOUSE will do.

Mass

Mass combat power at the decisive place and time. Coordinate, synchronize and harmonize combat power where it has a decisive effect on an enemy force in the shortest amount of time.

We mass all aspects of combat power – not merely the concentration of troops. The effects of crew served weapons, indirect fire, close air support, maneuver assets and even intangible considerations such as situational awareness can enable numerically smaller forces to win decisive victories!

Yet there are obvious dangers in massing. Our massed troops make an inviting target. Quick, violent acts limit the amount of time our troops are exposed to enemy fire while massed.

In simple tactical terms, mass combat power at one decisive point along the enemy’s formation. Do not attempt to attack all the enemy at once, everywhere! This exposes more of our troops to the enemy’s fire. Focus on breaching the enemy line and exploit that breach immediately.

Objective

Assign every subordinate unit and team a clearly defined and attainable objective. It matters little to the subordinate commander that his task is decisive, shaping or sustaining in the bigger picture of the mission. To that subordinate commander and unit, each task is decisive!

Without an assigned objective, teams are left without clear pictures of what they are suppose to achieve. In effect, they are useless, emasculated.

Keep in mind that the goal of warfare is to impose our will upon our enemy. Without a clearly defined objective, subordinate leaders and teams are left asking exactly how to achieve this.

Security

Never allow the enemy to gain an unexpected advantage. Yes, the enemy most certainly will have a set of advantages. This is inevitable. But we can mitigate known advantages, if nothing else than by avoiding them.

Situation awareness is a form of security. We must clearly identify and express the enemy’s most dangerous course of action (COA) and their most likely COA. This implies that we understand well the enemy’s capabilities, too.

Elusiveness is another form of security. We can achieve elusiveness through mobility speed or stealth. Either method makes it very difficult for the enemy to target our troops.

Security means force protection. And while any friendly COA involves an element of risk, security measures mitigate our vulnerability to hostile enemy counteractions.

Surprise

Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared. Surprise does not always mean to startle the enemy, though that is certainly acceptable.

Surprise can come in the manner of which we attack – that is the violence of action (VOA) and momentum achieved. If the enemy is ill prepared for this, VOA can decisively shift the balance of power on the battlefield.

Surprise can come in the time and place of our attack. If we attack from a time, direction or location for which the enemy is ill prepared, again we can achieve surprise. Deception such as a feign attack goes a long way in confusing the enemy as to the location of our decisive attack.

Surprise can come in the tempo of our operations. If we pulse our attacks continuously over a duration of time for which the enemy is ill prepared, we can achieve surprise. Unable to keep up with the resources required for a quick and continuous tempo, the enemy will yield.

Surprise is most commonly achieved through speed or stealth, followed by a particularly tenacious attack.

Maneuver

Gain and retain maneuver to place the enemy in a disadvantage. Maneuver is the flexible movement of forces within the battlespace.

Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balance and protects the force. Maneuver exploits success, preserves the initiative, and reduces our vulnerability to enemy targeting and fires. The effort is to continually pose new problems for the enemy by gaining a new direction of attack, eventually leading to the enemy’s defeat.

The lesson here is not to get bogged down, bunker down, and lose the momentum. If you do this you invite the enemy to outmaneuver your force, and they’ll seek the advantage of a better attacking position. Avoid this! Instead, gain and retain maneuver.

Offense

Gain, retain and exploit the initiative. Offensive action is the only way to impose our will upon our enemy. We defend only long enough to accumulate combat power and we then immediately go on the offensive again.

Offensive operations are the means by which we gain and maintain momentum. Momentum allows us freedom of maneuver and ultimately decisive victory.

The defense has its application, as spelled out above. However the mistake to avoid is the notion that we should sit still and wait to see what happens next. That only gives the initiative to our enemy, and soon we’ll be reactive instead of being proactive. That is the opposite of momentum.

Tactical leaders must gain, retain and exploit the initiative by seeking the offense.

Unity of Command

One commander for each operation – there can be only one!

Let us look at historic US examples of so-called “assumed exceptions” to this rule:

Operation Eagle Claw, Iran, April 1980 – multiple Special Operational Forces (SOF) meant multiple commands. Two aircraft crashed into each other at the beginning of this failed rescue mission; the result of two SOF commands not talking to each other. No unity of command.

Operation Gothic Serpent, Somalia, October 1993 – one conventional force and two SOF units meant three separate commands. The result was a poorly coordinated grab mission that resulted in the tactical defeat of two of America’s premier SOF units, as well as the strategic defeat of America’s objectives in Somalia. There was no unity of command.

Operation Anaconda, Afghanistan, March 2002 – one conventional command and two SOF units meant three separate commands, again not communicating effectively. The result effect was that more than 6,000 foreign terrorists successfully held up the US forces for weeks while they bought time and space for the bulk of their force to escape into Pakistan. Some believe Osama bin Laden was in the Shahi-Kot Valley during the beginning phase of this operation. No unity of command.

Seeing a pattern?

For every objective, seek unity of command and unity of effort. Unity of command means that all the forces fall under the authority of a single commander. This commander has the requisite authority to direct all forces in pursuit of a unified effort. Vary from this wisdom at your own peril.

Simplicity

“Keep It Simple, Stupid.” Otherwise known as The KISS Principle that states the more complex a plan is, the more certainly it will fail.

Leaders must prepare clear, uncomplicated plans. Leaders must issue concise orders to ensure understanding.

The objective of battle seems simple enough – beat the opponent’s brains out. But once you’re in the ring, the fight begins to look very complicated indeed! What was previously an impressive and complex plan before the fight begun, now looks hopelessly unachievable.

Simple plans and clear orders reduce confusion. Simplicity is not flashy or sexy, but it gets the job done time and time again.

Economy of Force

Focus the bulk of combat power at the decisive point of engagement. Safeguard this power greedily when allocating assets to shaping and sustaining missions.

Economy of force is the careful distribution of combat power. While no subordinate unit should ever be left without purpose, the allocation of available combat power to secondary tasks such as feign attacks, blocking delays, or even enveloping forces intended to fix the enemy in their escape routes must be measured in order to achieve mass at the decisive point and time.

Commanders and staffs need to ask themselves a simple question – “What is the most important part of this plan?” Then allocate as much combat power as possible to achieving that objective.

And there it is.

Some 200 years after Clausewitz penned the Principles of War, they are still relevant throughout the full spectrum of operations, and at every level of warfare – strategic, operational, and tactical.

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This article was originally published on odjournal.com (Olive Drab: the journal of tactics) and has been transferred here with permission.

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Let’s begin by separating planning from decision-making. Though clearly related and even intertwined, it helps to think of these as two distinct processes.

Planning can be found in Troop Leading Procedure (TLP) and its parallel build, the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). Decision-making is also very much a part of these two processes, but this topic has been discussed in a previous ODJ article (see “Decision-Making” 1 November 2007).For this article then we will focus on the process of developing a mission plan at the small unit level – small unit defined for our sake as being those units without a battle staff, expressly the company, platoon, squad and fireteam.

Planning, like decision-making, can be thought of in terms of mere seconds, minutes and hours.

Mission Planning in Seconds…

When there are only seconds to plan, both planning and decision-making combine in the OODA loop – Observe, Orient, Decide, Act. This is the realm of Immediate Action (IA) battle drills. Battle drills are not planning, per se, but as discussed in the earlier article are instead a sort of micro tactics that are the building blocks to the larger tactical scheme of fire and maneuver.

Frankly, with just seconds to spare there is no time to develop any plan; thus the use of the word “immediate” in IA battle drills.

Through the OODA loop we see instantaneous planning and decision-making unique to battle drills. Again, the Recognition Primed Decision (RPD) process championed by Dr. Gary Klein and Associates comes into play. RPD combined with the question sequence of the Battle Drill Matrix (BDM) are powerful tools for accessing our own experiences to select a single, appropriate plan – one of our rehearsed drills. We see planning and decision-making intersect in just seconds.

Observe the initial act of instigation. Orient on this phenomenon to determine exactly what it is. Decide on a course of action (COA). Take action!

Once you have taken action, you will need to immediately observe your sector of engagement to see if your COA had the desired effect. And the system repeats itself until you’ve either achieved the desired outcome, or you’ve moved to safety. The repetitive nature of this model is why it’s called the OODA loop.

Mission Planning in Minutes…

The quickly changing dynamic of the battle space means that more often than not our small tactical units must plan on the fly, given just minutes to form a COA.

Planning, or COA development to use the military vernacular, employs the “one-third: two-thirds” rule. That is, only the first third of the time allotted prior to mission start is used for planning. The remaining two-thirds of the time must be allocated to the issuing of the Operation Order (OPORD), rehearsals, and Pre-Combat Checks and Inspections (PCC/PCI).

So, you’ve got one hour before your mission begins? Then you have only 20 minutes to plan! Such is the nature of small unit tactics. As we say, “Embrace the Suck.”

Now there is so much to mission planning that it is nearly impossible to cover in a dozen articles, much less one. However, when there are just minutes to plan, experience dictates that a generic approach works best.

Basic problem solving involves four simplified steps:

1. Identify the problem.
2. Generate possible solutions.
3. Compare the alternatives.
4. Make a choice.

Identify the problem. If you were standing on the dockyard at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the problem is pretty clear. You’re under attack from the air.

Generate possible solutions. Call it intuition or perspective, but you’ll begin to generate possible COA based on your experiences and training. If you are a naval gunners mate then you’re probably thinking of manning a weapon system to defend the skies. If you’re a fireman then you’re likely thinking of fighting the fires. In either case, with minutes to plan you start to think in terms of resources – what’s available, who can help, what priority needs work first, and how best to array those resources to respond to the situation.

Compare the alternatives. Frankly, this most commonly happens as you talk or think through the possible solutions, and rarely occurs as a separate third step. But that’s okay. It is actually happening, and you’re accessing your own experiences as well as assumptions of specific actions and the likely outcome. This is triage. What objective has the highest priority versus what can we actually achieve now, with our available resources?

Make a choice. You have to answer that last question. You have to set into motion your plan by communicating it to others.

There are two mistakes to avoid here. One is to fail to plan at all. If you have the time, use it! The other mistake is to use nearly all of your time planning, and then hope to convey your plan in just 2 minutes with no rehearsal and no inventory of functioning equipment and supplies.

Use the one-third: two-thirds rule. If you have an hour to respond, you have only 20 minutes to plan. If you have only 15 minutes to respond, you have only 5 minutes to plan. But by all means – make a plan!

Mission Planning in Hours…

Alright, you’ve been given a mission that will start in less than five hours. The one-third: two-thirds rule gives you an hour and thirty minutes to plan. What’s going to happen here is a truncated, abbreviated Step 2. Mission Analysis and Step 3. COA Development from the 8-step process of the MDMP.

In the mission analysis phase we first gather our input products first. These might include a higher-level Warning Order (WARNO), Operation Order (OPORD), or staff estimates from the brigade or battalion battle staff officers. With an eye on developing our own OPORD nested within the mission of higher command we begin to ask, “what do we know” and “what must we assume” about this mission?

We need to understand the problem, that is, our mission statement. Hopefully that comes from higher command! But in some rare cases, it must be assumed based on the given situation and our specified and implied responsibilities. (Think back to that fireman or gunners mate at Pearl Harbor.)

In most cases we will have an OPORD from higher command. If so, we look at the mission statement, commander’s intent and commander’s guidance for constraints and restraints regarding the Mission, Enemy, Time, Terrain, Troops available and Civilians on the battlefield (METT-TC). We assessed the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) for enemy capability and positions, plus the lay of the land – Observation, Cover and concealment, Obstacles, Key terrain, and Avenues of approach (OCOKA). And we determine the enemy’s most likely COA versus the enemy’s most dangerous COA.

Each of these considerations above become an output product of mission analysis for our own OPORD – IPB, Mission Statement, Commander’s Intent, Commander’s Guidance – keeping in mind that we are nesting all of our products within the mission, role and responsibility of the higher command, the larger unit to which we belong.

In the second phase, COA development, we also consider input and output products. We have just created the input products in the earlier analysis phase, and so we again refer to our newly developed IPB, Mission Statement, Commander’s Intent and Guidance, plus the enemy’s most likely COA and enemy’s most dangerous COA.

Now we need to develop the output for COA development. This involves a careful consideration of our combat power relative to the enemy’s combat power. Who has the longer-range weapons? Faster firing weapons? Mass casualty weapons? Greater number of troops? Better-trained troops? And who holds the superior terrain and/or staying power regarding logistics?

We then array our forces to mitigate the danger of the enemy’s combat power. Remember, we don’t need to outnumber the enemy everywhere – but instead only at the point in which we will engage the enemy decisively.

We develop a scheme of fire with a scheme of maneuver. Keep in mind that fire without maneuver is a waste of ammunition. Maneuver without fires is a waste of human lives.

Wrap it all together using a basic concept sketch as an overlay to your IPB. The IPB is most commonly expressed as a series of graphic symbols that include fire and maneuver control measures laid over a map.

You’ve just developed a COA, or mission plan. Theoretically you develop at least two distinctly different COA and wargame them separately to analyze and compare the assumed outcomes. However, with just an hour and a half, it is more realistic to say that you are simultaneously building one COA while eliminating multiple other COA under an assessment of which plan is more feasible versus which plan will more likely achieve success.

Hopefully you’ve worked with your more experienced subordinate leaders to develop this mission plan. There is no sense in developing a complex plan in a vacuum unless that is your only option!

In any case, you must now “fill in the blanks” for paragraph 1, 2, 4, and 5 of the OPORD. Your selected COA becomes Paragraph #3 Execution of that same OPORD.

In this way, you’ve adhered to the one-third: two-thirds rule to mission planning development. And you’ve created a COA that lends itself to a credible, useful OPORD for your team in just an hour or more, leaving ample time to issue the OPORD, conduct a rehearsal and Pre-Combat Inspection (PCI) prior to start of the mission.

That’s what I’d call gaining a leg up on success. As a final word of caution, I’ll insist that you don’t become so enamored with your own plan, so wedded to it on basis of pride that you cannot remain objective or flexible. Remember that reconnaissance is an on-going process that potentially will throw significant changes into your COA development and OPORD. The enemy also gets a vote, and Mother Nature gets a vote. That’s life. Embrace the suck.

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This article was originally published on odjournal.com (Olive Drab: the journal of tactics) and has been transferred here with permission.

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Contemporary battle staffs trace their lineage to Napoleon Bonaparte’s Grand Army. This staff concept is employed in a multitude of variations by every major military today.

Battle staff officers are warfighters at the operational-level of conflict. They work on behalf of the commanding officer and employ a myriad of technical expertise and knowledge.

There are three levels of battle staff, S, G and J staffs. S staffs work for a field grade officer, a major, lieutenant colonel, or colonel at the battalion, regiment, or brigade level. G staffs work for a general officer, brigadier general through general at the division, corps or army level. And J staffs work for a general or admiral at the joint task force level.

What follows is a fundamental overview of the most prominent battle staff positions at the S staff battalion and brigade level, their roles and responsibilities, and the tools they use or develop as a product of warfighting.

This is not a “how to” article on operational warfighting. For that there is a 10-month school, the US Army’s Command & General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, KS. Additionally a reference for operational warfighting already exists, the Battle Staff SMARTbook (The Lightning Press). Yes, another shameless plug for our sponsors – but let’s be honest here, if our reader is already serving on a battle staff, they’re already aware of the best-selling SMARTbook series. Trust me.

Commanding Officer

Commanders at the battalion and brigade level are called simply the “CO” for commanding officer. At the highest level of joint forces they are called the Combined Joint Forces Land Component Commander (CJFLCC, pronounced “see-jay-flick”).

Regardless of their title, commanders are responsible for the outcome of the mission. This is an enormous burden to bear, and they will directly interface with each primary staff officer and each subordinate leader at some point during the planning phase and execution phase of the mission.

To aid in both the planning phase and execution phase, commanders develop two critical outputs for the mission – Commander’s Intent and Commander’s Guidance. Every staff estimate and each staff product continues to shape the commander’s understanding of the mission and the environment in which it will take place. This is a maturation process of situational awareness.

Finally, commanders impart what is known as Commander’s Presence by getting to know each of his staff officers and subordinate leaders, and allowing them to get to know him as well.

Executive Officer

At higher levels of command such as division, theater joint task force, or Unified Combatant Commands (UCC), each responsibility under the commander is tasked to a separate officer – Deputy Commander (DC), Chief of Staff (CoS), and Executive Officer (XO). At battalion and brigade level, the XO is almost invariably also the DC, ready to pick up the battle in the event of the CO’s absence. Furthermore, the XO also plays the role of CoS with the purpose of controlling and coordinating the staff through the battle rhythm.

The battle rhythm is typically a spreadsheet product used to synchronize the battle staff through the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). In addition to the numerous XO and DC duties, the CoS duties include coordination and control of all Commander’s Update Briefings (CUB).

Sergeant Major

The Command Sergeant Major (CSM), addressed as simply “Sergeant Major”, is the senior-most enlisted Soldier or Marine in the battalion or brigade. It is said amongst enlisted troops that there are only two Soldiers who wear stars, generals and sergeant majors. Interestingly, like a general officer, the sergeant major does not wear the collar insignia of his or her career specialty. They are generalists at this level of expertise.

The CSM answers directly to the CO and is the advocate for all NCO and enlisted troops in the unit. The CSM, like all staff officers is responsible for a staff estimate, with the CSM focused on the training proficiency, safety, plus health and wellness of troops to conduct the mission. Necessarily then, the CSM commonly interfaces with the S1 and S3 (Training), as well as Chaplain services, medical staff and each company’s first sergeant.

S1 Personnel Officer

The S1 Personnel Officer’s area of expertise is troop strength management during the planning phase, and casualty replacement operations during the execution phase.

During the planning phase, the S1 employs and updates the Timed Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD, pronounced “tip-fid”) to keep track of force deployments for use in theater from various staging areas. The S1 interfaces continually with the S2, S3 and S4 staffs in regard to personnel management and casualty replacement during all phases.

S2 Intelligence Officer

The S2 area of expertise is in Military Intelligence and counterintelligence operations. The S2 helps the CO develop all aspects of the Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR), and this serves directly in the shaping of the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB).

During the MDMP, the S2 plays the role of the Opposing Force (OPFOR) for course of action (COA) wargaming and analysis. Through this process facts and assumptions of each COA are identified.

The S2 interfaces with all other staff personnel and works very closely with the CO and S3.

S3 Operations Officer

It is often said that all staff officers are equal, but the S3 is the “most equal”. The S3 Operations Officer is the hub of the battle staff.

In the simplest terms, the S3 is responsible for implementing MDMP during the planning phase in order to develop the Operations Plan (OPLAN) until it becomes the Operations Order (OPORD). The S3 commonly plays the role of the battalion or brigade forces (BLUFOR) during COA wargaming. And during the execution phase, the S3 communicates Fragmentary Orders (FRAGO) to subordinate commanders. Though again, this is an oversimplified description of the S3 roles and responsibilities – which may include a separate S3 Training staff to ensure the force can achieve the mission.

If the S3 is the hub, every other part of the battle staff is a spoke stemming off from that hub. It is also said within battle staffs, “I don’t care if the CO did approve it. If you didn’t tell the S3, it ain’t gonna happen!”

It is imperative then that in addition to working with all other staff officers, the S3 works closely with the CO and XO (CoS).

S4 Logistics Officer

Perhaps the most underrated warfighter on the battle staff is the S4 Logistics Officer. After all, counting beans, bullets, batteries and band-aids is a thankless and inglorious job. Yet it is here in logistics that entire battles and indeed wars are won or lost.

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto was a leader who wisely mastered this nuanced influence of battle. It is said that he warned the Japanese War Council prior to the Second World War that he could deliver victory for Japan for one year before the American logistical might would turn the tide and crush the Empire of Japan. His warnings were not heeded, and yet it came to past.

During the planning phase the S4 develops the Logistics Estimate for the battalion or brigade. Additionally, the S4 develops the Combat Service Support (CSS) Execution Matrix to coordinate CSS operations for each COA generated. It is critical then that the S4 is present during the MDMP COA wargaming process because the S2 must identify facts and assumptions through the S4 input. These facts and assumptions are absolutely vital to CCIR.

The S4 Logistics Officer coordinates all CSS sustainment operations during the execution phase. This includes not only fuel, munitions and ration re-supply, but also casualty evacuation, vehicle recovery and maintenance operations, and troop transportation – as well as identifying main supply routes (MSR) and lines of communication (LOC) for each effort.

S5 Civil Affairs Officer

The S5 Civil Affairs (CA) Officer uses Mission Evaluation Criteria (MEC) to coordinate with, enhance, develop, establish, or control civil infrastructures in operational areas to support friendly operations. The UN and NATO refer to this as Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC).

To achieve this mission, the S5 interfaces with host national (HN) government as well as US and coalition Non-Government Organizations (NGO) and Other Government Agencies (OGA) outside the Department of Defense (DoD).

Additionally, the S5 role may also include Psychological Operations (PSYOP) missions to disrupt enemy activity or to win the support of the HN civilian population.

The S5 works closely with the S2 and S4 staffs to achieve CA and PSYOP missions.

S6 Communications Officer

The S6 is responsible for the entire communication network for the battalion or brigade. The communication staff uses the System Planning Worksheet to develop networks that links the Tactical Operation Center (TOC) to subordinate and supporting units. The S6 Communications Officer enforces communication security (COMSEC) and proper use of the Signal Operating Instructions (SOI – Army, CEOI – Marine Corps).

The S6 interfaces with every single staff section, all subordinate commands and units, as well as supporting units. Additionally, the S6 may be required to coordinate with coalition, HN, and NGO/OGA parties.

Targeting/FX Cell Leader

The targeting effects (FX) cell is typically formed through a break-out working group. As such the cell leader can be assigned by virtue of the nature of the mission, either kinetic or non-kinetic (violent or non-violent effects). During kinetic operations it is not uncommon for a liaison officer from a supporting artillery or armor unit, or feasibly even the Forward Air Controller/Combat Controller (FAC – Army, CC – Air Force) to act as the targeting cell leader.

Yet during non-kinetic operations such as humanitarian disaster relief missions, the targeting cell leader may be pulled from the S5 CA or PSYOP, and would certainly include representatives from the S2 and S4 shop.

Whatever the mission, the targeting cell uses a Targeting Synchronization Matrix for various effects and Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS). The targeting cell uses an established method of Decide, Detect, Deliver, and Assess (D3A) when determining which effect is needed, what to target, how to best achieve the effect, and how to assess the impact of the battalion or brigade efforts.

That is the modern battle staff in a nutshell. Is this an overly simplified description? Certainly. Furthermore, no two battle staffs are organized exactly the same way. The unit mission and Table Organizational Equipment (TOE) or Table Data Allowances (TDA) shape the battle staff organization.

Yet what is critical is that we’re able to appreciate tactical warfighting in the framework of operational warfighting, and bridge between the two. For mission planning purposes it is important that we, as tacticians, understand how the battle staff supports our mission as well as how we link to the rest of the battalion and brigade.

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This article was originally published on odjournal.com (Olive Drab: the journal of tactics) and has been transferred here with permission.

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This article was originally published on odjournal.com (Olive Drab: the journal of tactics) and has been transferred here with permission.