Commander’s Critical Information: What the leader needs to know, and needs to hide

by Matt GedersLeadershipPosted on Comments are Disabled

Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) are defined by the Department of Defense as a comprehensive list of information requirements identified by the commander as being critical in facilitating timely information management and the decision making process that affect successful mission accomplishment.

Huh. Well that’s a workable definition, though it creates a breech of protocol by including in the definition the same words as the term being defined. My high school English teacher would say this definition is a bit vague. I certainly had to read it a few times before it started to sink in.

How about this instead – CCIR is intelligence data needed to make well-informed decisions.

I tend to think the first “c” (commander) implies the “whom” of the term and definition. But frankly there is a bit of a danger here in overemphasizing the commander in the definition. Yes, it is certainly true that the commander dictates the CCIR with the help of experienced subordinates. It is further true that the commander is an end user of CCIR, and is ultimately responsible for the outcome of the mission. However, it would be a mistake to think that CCIR is solely used and gathered by the commander!

Every Soldier a sensor. This expression illustrates exactly who is responsible for gathering and passing along CCIR. Everyone.

Okay, we’ve defined CCIR as the intelligence data the commander needs to make decisions. But what exactly is that intelligence data? And where does it come from? How do we collect it and report it?

Doctrinally speaking there are two subsets of CCIR that concern the collection of intelligence data – Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR), and Friendly Force Intelligence Requirements (FFIR). Yet from a practical perspective there is a third concern, the Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI).

PIR may be simply defined as “what the commander needs to know about the enemy.”

FFIR could then be defined as “what the commander needs to know about his own forces.”

EEFI includes “information the commander wants to hide from the enemy.”

So if you’ll pardon the alphabet soup of military acronyms, CCIR includes PIR and FFIR in terms of intelligence data collecting; plus EEFI in terms of information security. Such definitions may be overly simplistic, however at the tactical level of warfare these definitions are both accurate and pragmatic.

Priority Intelligence Requirements

PIR is information the commander needs to know about the enemy. Of course this entails the disposition of the enemy force, but also subtleties that may not be so obvious at first.

PIR may also include the disposition of the civilian populous relative to enemy efforts, as well as weather and terrain conditions that impact enemy operations and logistics. Have winter snows closed down the high altitude pass from which the enemy is relying for supplies? Has the civilian population and/or key leaders turned against the enemy force due to recent enemy activities? If so, this PIR is indeed critical to the commander’s next decision, assuming of course the commander wishes to exploit the enemy’s disadvantage.

More commonly, PIR entails:

– The enemy’s location and position.
– The enemy’s activities or significant actions (SIGACT).
– The enemy’s relative combat power – troop strength and morale, weapon capability, logistical constraints, and communication restraints.
Every bit as important as where the enemy is located – is where the enemy is not. Where the enemy is not also opens doors of possibilities.

It’s worth mentioning that where the civilian population is absent requires some explanation, too. Especially when civilians are absent from locations where they normally populate and reside.

Who collects PIR? Again, everyone. But PIR is further assigned to Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets. This includes virtually every imaginable type of patrol, mounted or dismounted, as well as more sophisticated collection methods used by Signal Corps electronic warfare and Military Intelligence via manned and unmanned aerial vehicle (M/UAV) platforms. Finally, networks of spies and informants are also used to collect human intelligence (HUMINT).

What is critical about PIR, like all aspects of CCIR, is that it must be identified and assigned! PIR that is too general in nature will be easily and routinely overlooked. PIR needs to be specific enough to focus intelligence collection efforts on the objective. It should also be assigned to specific units for collection. PIR must not be left to the “honey do” list of various units, unchecked. After all, the only tasks that get completed are those tasks that are checked.

Friendly Force Intelligence Requirements

FFIR is information the commander needs to know about his own forces. Yes, this includes the disposition of friendly forces during operations. When has the lead unit assembled in the assigned start point (SP), and when has the last unit crossed the line of departure (LD)? These are exactly the sorts of questions the commander needs to know about the status of his forces. But FFIR is so much bigger in scope than merely fire and maneuver coordination.

A plan is based on a series of facts and assumptions. If the facts change or the assumptions are no longer valid, the commander must then adjust the plan!

Who informs the commander of these changes in facts and assumptions about our friendly forces? Aren’t FFIR assigned to some staff officer in the Tactical Operation Center (TOC)? The answer isn’t as simple yes or no.

Yes, certainly a staff officer is assigned to report specific changes in FFIR. But a TOC can only report what it knows – that is, what has been reported to the TOC by subordinate units. This requires timely and accurate reports from the subordinate units.

It also requires specific FFIR delineated by the commander to subordinate leaders:
– Report at 10, 20 and 30 percent troop casualties for the unit in whole.
– Report at 50 percent troop casualties for any single subordinate unit.
– Report at 10, 20 and 30 percent consumption of ammunition or fuel for the unit in whole.
– Report at 50 percent consumption of ammunition or fuel for any single subordinate unit.
– Report at 50 percent loss of crew served weapons for any single subordinate unit.
– Report at 25 percent loss of land-borne vehicles for any single subordinate unit.
– Report any loss of air-borne vehicles.
– Report any loss of medical evacuation assets.
– Report any loss of ISR assets.
Note that some FFIR look at the unit as a whole, while other FFIR consider the conditions of each subordinate unit. A battalion commander would consider the relative operational power of each rifle company; a company commander would consider the same of each platoon; and a platoon would consider each squad’s combat power.

It’s not that any single condition set above would absolutely result in the culmination of the mission. However, each of these FFIR may very well mean the commander would need to adjust accordingly to the new facts and assumptions.

If the lead element in an attack has hit 50 percent losses in personnel, the commander may opt to rotate that unit to the rear of the formation and let another unit take the lead. Furthermore heavy losses due to casualties may mean a further strain on medical evacuation assets, which in turn might potentially clog the lines of communication (LOC) – the route or axis of the advance.

Likewise, if the friendly reserve force has consumed 30 percent of its fuel, it can likely still achieve its assigned mission. When that consumption hits the 50 percent mark, the commander may want to allocate fuel supplies to the reserve force.

Yet without FFIR being fed back to the commander, these decisions and adjustments go unmade. This can be fatal to our mission.

How do we identify those specific FFIR? Many FFIR become apparent through our assumptions of friendly force capabilities through the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). More specifically this occurs during MDMP Step 4. COA Analysis, more commonly called wargaming the multiple courses of action (COA). During the wargaming process we must state facts and assumptions about friendly force capabilities, and make decisions based on these facts and assumptions. These facts and assumptions can then be identified as FFIR.

Once the FFIR is identified, this information is communicated to subordinate unit leaders. A system of checks and a system of reporting is also implemented. Finally, contingency plans must be identified in case these facts later change or assumptions prove invalid.

FFIR has been far less practiced as a system than PIR. It’s not that the troops don’t see the problems as they become apparent, but more commonly there is no identified means of communicating the problem when it becomes apparent. And even when FFIR is reported in a timely and accurate manner, if there is no contingency plan, it makes it all the more difficult for the commander to adjust to the new facts and assumptions.

Commanders need to be abreast of FFIR, and those staff officers and subordinate leaders taking part in the wargaming of different COA during the MDMP must step up with specific information regarding FFIR. After all, every plan is based on facts and assumptions. The limits of these facts and assumptions become FFIR for the commander!

Essential Elements of Friendly Information

EEFI is information the commander wants to hide from the enemy. Much of this, too, is fairly intuitive – the battle plan, signal operating instructions (SOI), troop strength and movements are all operational security (OPSEC) concerns and need to be kept secret, hidden away from enemy spies and ISR assets. Yet like PIR, EEFI also includes subtleties that aren’t immediately obvious.

For example the enemy typically knows the location of friendly troops. The enemy is at least aware of the general position of our forward line of troops (FLOT). If we are conducting patrolling operations from a Forward Operating Base (FOB) the enemy is almost certainly aware of the exact location and dimensions of our FOB. But the enemy wouldn’t know where inside the FOB the command, control and communications (C3) nodes were located.

Zebras, after all are well suited to hiding amongst the herd of zebras. In a similar manner, C3 nodes, troops billets and logistical depot locations are unknown to the enemy even when the enemy has a pretty good idea where our forces are. And clearly, these concerns fall under EEFI.

If the enemy knew the locations of these priority nodes and placed them under direct or indirect fires during a critical phase of the mission, the disruption to C3 or logistical sustainment could be catastrophic. So we need to establish the EEFI and protect them under Operational Security (OPSEC) methods.

Who identifies EEFI? Not surprisingly, EEFI are also derived from the MDMP wargaming process. Each COA will have a set of EEFI, information that we need to hide from the enemy in order for the mission to be successful. While anyone can identify EEFI, typically the S2 Intelligence Officer is responsible for identifying through the COA wargaming process and recommending EEFI to the commander.

Again, there are subtleties that need to be grasped. For example, during the COA wargaming phase an experienced warrior may understand the importance of protecting the rules of engagement (ROE) under EEFI. If the enemy understands the limits of the ROE, they can and will leverage that information against our friendly forces. During Operation Gothic Serpent, enemy knowledge of the US Army ROE is precisely how Somali clansmen were able to get so close to US forces and wreak havoc in the Battle of Mogadishu.

The US Army defines EEFI as critical aspects of a friendly operation that if known by the enemy, would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation.

Again, EEFI evolve from facts, assumptions and key tasks of the mission. EEFI are discovered through the MDMP and everyone helps in identifying EEFI. However it is important to remember that EEFI isn’t doctrinally part of CCIR, and it doesn’t become a priority until the commander establishes the EEFI. Commanders – you must establish EEFI.

CCIR is necessary for the commander to make well-informed decisions, and as such CCIR has a critical impact on virtually every aspect of the mission. PIR is the means by which the commander tasks his ISR assets. FFIR is the means by which the commander understands the status of each subordinate unit during the mission. And EEFI involves critical information the commander needs to hide from the enemy, for the success of the mission.

Each aspect must be identified, assigned, and a system of reporting must be implemented for CCIR to function. Without CCIR we cannot meaningfully adjust the plan once we’ve begun.

This article was originally published on odjournal.com (Olive Drab: the journal of tactics) and has been transferred here with permission.

 

The 70 Percent Solution: Perspectives of Time Management

by Matt GedersLeadershipPosted on Comments are Disabled

Be willing to make decisions. That’s the most important quality in a good leader. Don’t fall victim to what I call the ready-aim-aim-aim-aim syndrome. You must be willing to fire. — T. Boone Pickens

I am quick to point out that while leadership and management are inextricably entwined, leadership is a universal art whereas management is industry specific. Alright then, it’s time I put some weight behind that statement. Let’s talk time management from multiple industry perspectives – corporate, academic, and martial.

Corporate Time Management

Whether its time to plan, decide, or produce, the corporate world looks at the bottom line, profit. Thank God they do. We wouldn’t want it any other way. And because of this, business innovates quickly in order to remain competitive with other businesses.

To explore this point further, we have to ask ourselves, “How late is acceptable?” For a business meeting, or for a product deadline the answer to that question is pretty much the same. How much can the profit margin tolerate?

Don’t misunderstand my point here. Speed is identified as one of the three great values in business. As they say, you can have it cheap, good or fast. So speed is a concrete value, but only so much as the profit line is involved.

There is some room to fudge here then. If we cannot have it fast, but we manage to produce our product or perform our service cheap and good, then the profit margin will do well. So in terms of speed, the corporate world balances this requirement with other considerations. Yet ultimately the bottom line is profit.

Academic Time Management

In contrast to the corporate perspective on time, the academic world see little value to speedy process or decision. Instead, academia places value on being correct.

The academic process might be simplified in terms of hypothesis, experiment and assessment. We only accept a hypothesis as “fact” once it has gone through this academic process exhaustively and multiple scholars come to the same conclusion. And nowhere in this process is speed discussed as a value.

Understandably, academia innovates very slowly – the same as other institutions of government and religion. Being correct is valuable. And if it takes considerable time to find the correct solution or conclusion, so be it.

How late is acceptable in academia? It’s hard to say. Anecdotally the professor sometimes fails to show up for class. But that’s okay, we’ll catch up on the lesson later in the week. And our thesis might take an extra semester, but what’s one more semester after four years of work?

The bottom line here is that our work better be correct. This requires the 100 percent solution.

Military Time Management

How late is acceptable in the military? I can answer that question succinctly with another question. “What’s ‘late’?”

There is no such thing as “late” in the military. The military will not detain or delay a flight, a ship, or a convoy for late military personnel. Those Soldiers, Marines, Sailors or Airmen simply missed movement, to use the military vernacular. That offense is punishable by law.

Military subordinates are not late for the commander’s meeting. They simply missed the meeting. There is an armed NCO assigned to lock the door once the meeting begins. No one is allowed to enter the commander’s meeting after it has begun. And trying to force the tent flap open to get inside is a good way to get your arm broken by one seriously angry NCO!

Let me put this another way. It is said throughout the military, “If you are not 10 minutes early, you ARE late.”

Martial discipline is not concerned with being 100 percent correct. Neither is it concerned with profit. Instead, the military is concerned with understanding first, deciding first, and acting first.

Unlike other government institutions, the military must innovate quickly within the battlespace – albeit not so quickly within the military institution itself. That means the educational institution of the military slowly evolves, but rarely experiences revolutionary change. However, on the field of battle it is quite another matter.

A 70 percent solution today is far more valuable than the 100 percent solution tomorrow. Tomorrow is too late. The battle will be lost or won by then.

Furthermore and perhaps more pertinently still, a 100 percent solution is useless and potentially dangerous. Humans invest their pride in a 100 percent solution. They become married to that idea until it succeeds or fails. That can be fatal on the battlefield.

By contrast, a 70 percent solution presumes changes and additions to the plan will be required. After all, the enemy gets a vote, too. So does Mother Nature.

The enemy has no interest in seeing our beautiful plan become successful, regardless of whether our plan has been established at 70 percent or 100 percent. The enemy is intent on upsetting our best laid plans!

Our plan cannot control the weather or terrain or daylight. The universe expands and changes in predictable randomness.

Given that the enemy and Mother Nature both get a say in our plan, there is zero benefit for us to ever finalize the plan. Once a leader estimates his or her plan to about the 70 percent mark, it is time to put the plan into action.

“Understand First” means to gain situational awareness. “Decide First” means to establish a plan at about the 70 percent solution. “Act First” means to seek the initiative and disrupt the enemy’s actions and decision-making.

In the martial industry, he who gets to the 70 percent solution first – acts first. And more often than not, that translates into battlefield victory.

This article was originally published on odjournal.com (Olive Drab: the journal of tactics) and has been transferred here with permission.

 

Management of the Defense: Conviction of Purpose

by Matt GedersDefensive Operations, LeadershipPosted on Comments are Disabled

Few tacticians give the defense its due. But for the record, history does. The slaughter of Union troops at Fredericksburg, Virginia; the massive carnage of Confederate forces at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania; the unimaginable horror at Ypres, France; and the wasting of a million Chinese lives along the 38th Parallel between the Koreas. All of these examples illustrate the effect of a well-managed defense.

On occasion history records the devastation of the offense, too. By and large, however, the worst days of carnage in the human existence have come from well-organized defenses. A logical argument would state that what is true in military history should be reflected in military simulation – but that is so rarely the case.

How did it come to this? What factors contribute to the myth that the offense is the stronger tactic, and how do these myths impact wargaming simulation?

Yes, these questions are the basis of a doctoral dissertation and I’ll save you the lengthy reading. It might be best boiled down to “conviction of purpose”. That is, because the offense requires the expense and resources to mobilize and project a military force, it appears that military gamers assume the greater conviction of purpose should be awarded to the offensive force. At the same time, an inverted argument is applied to the defensive force – namely that because the defense does not mobilize and project itself, the conviction of purpose for the defense is low.

These assumptions stack the card just a bit at the higher echelon of planning and wargaming. But a similar set of assumptions occurs at the small unit tactical level. After all, who comes out to a Saturday game wanting to sit in a muddy trench while it’s raining? Right! We came to fight and we’re going to go find a fight!

Again, the conviction of purpose appears to belong to offensive action. It’s a shame, really, when a victory is often lost for want of just sitting still.

Let’s be very clear on this. The defense has no intrinsic value. That is, the defense is not executed as a final state. There is no “perfect defense” because humans are smart and will, in time, figure a way around or through your defense. That means we must seek to impose our will upon our opponent, and this is only achieved through offensive action.

So the defense is assumed in order to (1) allow time to build a larger friendly force, and/or to (2) wear down the opponent by allowing them to be destroyed in the defenses carefully prepared engagement areas. Both of these purposes have the focus of increasing the friendly-to-enemy force ratio.

The theory is fairly straightforward. Its application is quite another matter. As stated earlier, the troops simply don’t want to sit still long enough for the defense to be effective. They didn’t come out to play MILSIM by sitting on their laurels!

Here is an opportunity where effective leadership comes into play. Set the troops’ expectation. It might be just that simple. From the onset of the mission, explain that the mission is defense. Explain what is possible – victory. Furthermore, explain that only after the enemy force has been wasted on your brilliant defense will the troops get the opportunity to finish off the opponent with an equally brilliant assault. Show them the plan and then rehearse it. Be sure to rehearse the transition to offensive action so that your troops see exactly how they will envelop the retreating enemy and defeat them in their routes of egress.

Keeping the troops motivated is critical to the defense. This means keeping the troops informed!

Furthermore, if your defense requires more than two hours to hold (and most do) then be sure to manage your resources effectively. No troop can be expected to remain diligently searching the landscape for more than two hours at a time. Heat, cold, insects, rain, hunger, exhaustion all play heavily on fatiguing the defenders and it’s only a matter of time before the troops stop paying attention to their front. That’s not bad soldiering; it’s poor leadership.

Take into account the experience and exhaustion of your troops to calculate the time that they can be expected to effectively maintain watch from a static position. Typically this is an hour, but no more than two hours. Now multiply that times three shifts.

The defense is essentially broken into three shifts or areas of responsibility. This includes the line, screening patrols forward of the line, and the reserve force. Plan on dividing your defense into three equally sized shifts.

The line occupies and maintains all essential positions along the defensive line. This includes command positions, crew served weapon positions, observation/listening posts, and enough rifle positions to adequately defend the line. Don’t assume that every position needs to be occupied. In a sustained fight, these positions will likely be reinforced by the reserve force or returning forward patrols.

The screening force patrols forward of the line. They serve to deny access to enemy reconnaissance teams and to conduct spoiling attacks on massing enemy forces. The screening force acts as advanced notice of enemy activity. This activity gets the troops moving periodically. Patrolling is invigorating. It serves the individual troops in obtaining a broader perspective of the battlefield, and updates the commander’s situational awareness. But again, we can only expect the troops to patrol for a couple hours before becoming exhausted. They need rotation, too.

The reserve force is perhaps the most critical part of the defense. The reserve force can fill a gap in the line to bolster the defense; it can occupy secondary or alternative defensive positions in the event the front line is faltering and needs to withdraw; and the reserve force can transition quickly to offensive action and envelop a repelled enemy force as they attempt to escape through their routes of egress.

Because the reserve force is so critical to an effective defense, it is typically located just behind the line, out of sight of enemy reconnaissance teams. What’s more, unlike the line and the screening patrols, the reserve force really doesn’t have much of a job until the enemy attacks. This makes it ideally located and suited to rest the troops. As a reserve force, the troops can eat, sleep, clean their weapon, and brush their teeth – the mundane things that hinder them from being effective on the line or on patrol.

So the routine is set. A couple hours on the line, a couple hours on patrol, and a couple hours of rest as a reserve force, and the defense is effectively managed. After a few days on the front line, another friendly force typically replaces the entire unit so that it may retire to the rear security areas and more adequately rest, plan, and re-equip.

So proper management of the defense is its greatest advantage? Yes, in a sense. A defending force with a unifying conviction of purpose, a plan to affect that purpose, and a rotational cycle that permits the force to carry on are arguably the most important characteristics of the defense.

This is not to diminish the importance of interlocking sectors of fire that make use of terrain to slow the approaching enemy in prepared engagement areas. Synchronized combat power and an excellent communication and logistical plan are paramount. All too true. Yet for all the gadgetry and wonderful positioning of the defense, it is all for not if the troops are exhausted, poorly managed, and uniformed.

To recap, the defense is used temporarily. The intent is to obtain a favorable friendly-to-enemy force ratio either through reinforcements or through attrition of the opponent’s force. Once a favorable force ratio is achieved, the defense must transition to offensive action in order to impose will. But it is this “in between time” – the time the friendly force assumes the defense that is so critical. Poorly managed defenses simply fall apart. Effectively managed defenses have been recorded by history as being agents of wholesale devastation!

This article was originally published on odjournal.com (Olive Drab: the journal of tactics) and has been transferred here with permission.